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EL CERRITO REVISITED

RICHARD L. NOSTRAND

IN THE SPRING OF 1939 two social scientists from the Department
of Agriculture, Olen E. Leonard and Charles P. Loomis, were
bouncing along a rough mesa road in a car some thirty miles southwest of Las Vegas, New Mexico, "looking for a typical SpanishAmerican village to study."1 Suddenly, they came to the edge of a
high bluff that overlooked the Pecos Valley and the village of EI
Cerrito. They stopped the car, and without saying a word, got out
to gaze down at the Pecos as it tied a "silvery knot" about the little
cluster of houses and small rectangular fields. So captivated were
they with EI Cerrito's quaintness and beauty that their desire to
make it their study-village was immediate. As they inquired about
EI Cerrito, they found that it was, indeed, representative of the
local villages, with the important exception that it was not split
into rival clans or factions. So in late 1939 and in 1940 Leonard
and Loomis took up residence in EI Cerrito and from the experience wrote a comprehensive and insightful modern-day classic. 2
Since 1940 EI Cerrito has undergone dramatic change, some of
which was captured in a restudy Loomis undertook in 1956. 3 Since
1940, moreover, population census schedules of 1900 have been
released, and EI Cerrito, one of the relatively few "Hispano"4 villages clearly identified within its census precinct, can be described
accurately. 5 The fortunate coincidence of the existence of the Leonard and Loomis study in 1940 and the availability of village-specific
data for 1900 made a village restudy irresistible. So in 1980 the
present author temporarily resided in and was a frequent visitor
to the village-with the primary aim of analyzing its demographic
dynamics since the turn of the century.

0028-6206/82/0400-0109 $1. 40/0
© Regents, University of New Mexico

Figure 1.

EI Cerrito setting. Between the dam and the village the Pecos River cuts deeply into the
mesa, and little floodplain exists. The valley widens downstream where the river meanders,
however, and there villagers have water rights to some 113 floodplain acres. In 1980 water
was conducted through the gravity-flow ditch only to the village-fronting floodplain. The
cemetery lies atop the mesa near an isolated valley cerrito (small hill) after which the Village
is named. The map is based on field work in 1980; the vertical air photo is No. 1689,
CHX 3 146, taken 21 September 1939 by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration.
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In 1900, 136 people (thirty families) lived in El Cerrito, a number
that probably accounted for all villagers. 6 All were Hispanos who,
for the most part, were related; all owned their homes free of
mortgage; and all probably owned several acres of irrigable floodplain on which they grew household foodstuffs and livestock forage.
Each person apparently lived in the compact little village that lay
nestled on a low spur of mesa land within a meander of the Pecos
River (Fig. 1).7
Eighteen of the thirty heads of household were stockmen-ten
stock raisers and eight stock herders. The stock raisers grazed their
large flocks of sheep and smaller herds of cattle on the surrounding
higher mesa that they used free or leased inexpensively from the
state and federal governments. s They were the village patrons, and
they probably employed the eight stock herders. 9 Four heads of
household were "day laborers," who may have worked for the patrons or perhaps had jobs outside the village; two were farmers;
one was a blacksmith; one was a carpenter; and four-all sixty-five
or older-had no occupation. About 1900, a man, reportedly a cruel
person, was a school teacher, but no one with that occupation was
listed in the census schedules of 1900. 10
The villagers thought of themselves as stockmen, not as farmers,lI and wool was El Cerrito's single important product. 12 Both
these conditions were soon altered when the villagers lost their
common mesa land. In 1904 only 5,148 of 315,300 acres claimed
were confirmed by the Court of Private Land.Claims to residents
of the San Miguel del Bado Grant. 13 Most of the awarded acreage
was Pecos floodplain along which most of the grant's inhabitants
lived in ten villages. 14 El Cerrito, last of the land grant villages
going downstream, was given a roughly circular 117.65-acre tract
that contained only the village and its solares (house lots) and the
small irrigated plots located on the adjacent constricted floodplain. IS
After 1904 some villagers were able to purchase or lease mesa land,
and after 1916 many families homesteaded mesa tracts offrom forty
to 640 acres;16 but the homesteaded tracts were scattered in a
"crazy-quilt" pattern, many had no water, and in the end only two
stock raisers were able to piece together the large contiguous hold-

.
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ings needed for successful ranching in a semiarid environment. 17
The full impact of the loss of the common mesa land was not
immediately felt,18 Until 1916, the stock raisers apparently continued to graze their livestock on what was now public domain. 19 The
early decades of the twentieth century were prosperous times when
many male villagers readily found temporary employment cutting
railroad ties or working for railroads in New Mexico, picking cotton
in Texas, or working in sugar beet fields and steel mills in Colorado. 20 However, access to the mesa land was curtailed by homesteading after 1916, the temporary jobs di~~ppeared when the Great
Depression arrived in the late 1920s, and economic conditions
became desperate. Only after 1933, when government relief programs began, was a temporary outside source of income again
available to heads of households. 21 By enrolling at government
camps, boys and girls supplemented family income as well. 22
In 1940 the number of villagers was unchanged: 135 people
(twenty-one families) resided permanently in El Cerrito. 23 An additional five men, each of whom constituted a family, had moved
away, yet they continued to own, and occasionally to revisit, their
village homes. 24 As in 1900, all villagers were Hispanos,25 practically
everyone was related,26 and all owned their homes and their several-acre floodplain tracts, or they were in line to inherit them. 27
And nearly all families lived in the compact village. 28
Only two families in 1940 owned sheep and cattle, and the one
"big sheepman" employed three laborers, the village's only fulltime employees. 29 Some heads of household had temporary employment: one male school teacher/principal from the village presumably received an outside income;30 for a fee, one family boarded
the second school teacher, a woman from Villanueva;31 and a local
woman was paid a small sum by the church to conduct services in
the absence of the priest. 32 But the majority barely survived by
irrigating their one- to four-acre floodplain tracts and by dry farming
portions of their homesteaded mesa tracts. 33 A little income was
derived from the sale of peaches and beans and from pinon nuts
gathered on the mesa. 34 Some of the younger people who had
recently spent time in government camps or had been away to
school were now expressing a preference to live outside the village,
but very few families were considering leaving it. 35 Although aware
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of their plight, most villagers clung tenaciously to their irrigated
land as they searched for outside employment; everyone knew that
some major change was inevitable. 36
That change happened almost immediately, and it took the form
of a major exodus of families. The 'war effort in the early 1940s
provided defense-related construction jobs at air fields and in airplane factories in New Mexico, caused mines to reopen in Arizona,
and brought about farm labor jobs again in Colorado. By September
of 1942 a number of EI Cerrito men, some with their families,
were engaged in all three enterprises. 37 Gradually, however, villagers gravitated to the cities as men obtained work, established a
"beachhead," and later brought families and relatives from EI Cerrito. 38 The long-term results of the exodus were clear by the summer of 1956: of the twenty-six permanent and nonresident families
present in 1940, fifteen had moved away, four-fifths of them going
to Pueblo and the rest to Denver, Albuquerque, and Las Vegas;
three had died; and only eight remained, four of which were older
couples. 39 These eight families represented one-fourth of EI Cerrito's population in 1940;40 more villagers now lived in Pueblo than
in "La Placita," as they affectionately called EI Cerrito. 41 In 1956
only three or four families planned to stay in EI Cerrito,42 and the
exodus obviously continued, because about 1968-69 only five people in two families remained--'--the nadir of twentieth-century population. 43
About the time EI Cerrito's population reached its lowest ebb,
Anglos began to buy parts of the village. 44 In about 1965 and 1968,
two Anglo parties purchased solares, irrigated land, and mesa land
from villagers, but neither moved into the village. 45 A hippie pair
known as Mad John and Dirty Barry, who rented a village house
for some six months in 1970, were the first (nonacademic) Anglos
to live in EI Cerrito. During the next few years five additional
Anglo parties, a dozen people in all, rented houses in the village
for as long as several years, and one of them, a couple arriving in
late 1971, remained permanently. With three couples and a bachelor (in all, six Anglos and three Hispanos), the permanent couple
purchased five solares and some irrigated land in 1972. By 1980,
then, six Anglo parties had lived in the village, one of them remaining permanently, and three Anglo parties (the last being the

Figure 2.

Village of El Cerrito in April 1941 (above) and December 1980 (below), looking northeast.
Houses with flat roofs had to be shoveled of snow, and a mantilla (cloth) hung at the ceiling
caught any dust; by 1980 all occupied buildings had pitched roofs covered with sheet iron
or aluminum. Upper photo by Irving Rusinow, National Archives' Neg. 83-G-37795; lower
photo by author.
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mixture of Anglos and Hispanos) owned seven of the village's approximately twenty-six solares, 28.5 of approximately 113 acres
having water rights, and mesa land. 46
When the census was taken in 1980, eleven people (five families)
resided in EI Cerrito. Nine were Hispanos, most of whom were
related, and two were Anglos. Although the two Anglos were neither Roman Catholic nor fluent in Spanish,47 they were very much
accepted by the villagers and an integral part of the community.
Soon after moving to EI Cerrito, the husband worked for many
days to help repair the dam; residents respected him for his technical skills and grantsmanship abilities. By 1980 he had been elected
president of the community acequia (irrigation ditch) commission;
his wife, moreover, was in charge of the community well. 48 In 1980
all the villagers (or members of their extended families) owned
their homes and their irrigation plots, and all lived in the compact
village.
Of the five heads of household, two were primarily irrigation
farmers and cattle ranchers. One, the son of a villager who had
grown up in Pueblo and in the last several years had moved to EI
Cerrito with his immediate family to tend the family's land holdings,
had recently installed a pipeline across the Pecos in an ambitious
attempt to transfer water from the village irrigation ditch to fifty
acres on which his family had water rights in the neck of bottomland
lying just downstream from the village. Two others were primarily
farmers. One, also the son of a villager who had moved from Pueblo
two years earlier to live with his elderly aunt, was a student at
New Mexico Highlands University in Las Vegas as well. The second
farmer was the Anglo. The last head of household was now retired.
Besides the five permanent families, El Cerrito had fourteen
nonresident families (approximately sixty-five people, three ofthem
Anglos) in 1980. 49 Nine lived in Pueblo, Las Vegas, and Albuquerque, and the remainder lived in other New Mexico and Colorado
communities. All fourteen families owned houses in EI Cerrito,
some were registered users of irrigation water, and some owned
mesa land on which they ran cattle. 50 On weekends and during
va~ations, most of these families returned to EI Cerrito to maintain
their properties, 51 and half of them planned to retire in EI Cerrito.

,
1
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Resident's Home
Nonresident's Home
Vacant/Substantial Ruin

Rental House
~ Guest House

Church
::::::::::: Dirt Road
- - - Irrigation Ditch

School
00 Mill
~ Well
~ Barn/Shed/Gara e

Village of El Cerrito in 1940 (above) and 1980 (below). The 1940 map is after Leonard and
Loomis, El Cerrito, p. 38, and is somewhat speculative--for example, the condition of the
mill is not known, and the existence of a plank bridge over the irrigation ditch above it is
only a;sumed. The 1980 map is based on field work; not shown are corrals (unless they
were in substantial ruin), greenhouses, outhouses, minor ruins, and driveways.
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By 1980, then, EI Cerrito has undergone severe depopulation,
yet many departed families continue to be active nonresidents. The
presence of nonresidents explains why, four decades after depopulation began, the village has changed so little in appearance (Fig.
2). For although a few new structures such as the well house have
been added, and a few old ones including the one two-story house
have almost melted away, the village of 1940 is still immediately
recognizable in 1980. 52 On the other hand, depopulation leaves its
mark in occupance patterns (Fig. 3). The consolidation of several
homes between 1940 and 1980 complicates generalizing, yet the
number of permanently occupied houses decreased from twentyone to five, the number used by nonresidents increased from five
to fourteen, and a number are now in substantial ruin. 53
In 1940 villagers perceived that their economic woes were directly attributable to the loss in 1904 of their common grazing
land. 54 The failure of all but two stock raisers to acquire viable
grazing land units out of the public domain after 191655 and a
general unwillingness among most heads of households to utilize
more efficiently their arable floodplain,56 however, must not be
ignored. Indeed, the economic vitality of this stock-raising community before 1904 is brought into question when one discovers
that, as early as the mid-1870s, El Cerrito men had taken temporary
railroad construction jobs and had supplied ties to the Santa Fe
Railroad. 57 Thus, a combination of push factors at the village level
and the pull of the city seems to explain El Cerrito's dramatic
population loss after 1940.
Taken together, Hispano villages range along a continuum from
those that have undergone complete abandonment, as in the case
of La Ventana in the Rio Puerco Valley, to those that have experienced population growth, as-for example at Penasco in southern
Taos County. EI Cerrito is, of course, representative of the many
villages that have undergone severe depopulation. 58 The EI Cerrito
example is instructive, for it suggests that where dramatic population losses occurred, many families continue to be active nonresidents. It suggests also that Hispano villages may be rejuvenating;
iIi El Cerrito, two sons of nonresident villagers have recently become residents, and some nonresident villagers plan to retire there.
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It suggests further that the influx ofAnglos has not only contributed
to this apparent rejuvenation but also has probably ended the days
of ethnic purity in Hispano villages. Finally, the EI Cerrito example
underscores that village depopulation involved primarily younger
people who moved to urban areas during the quarter century between 1940 and the mid-1960s.

NOTES
1. This account of selecting El Cerrito was given in Charles P. Loomis, "Informal Groupings in a Spanish-American Village," Sociometry 4 (February 1941):
36-40, quote on p. 36. The same paper, released in mimeographed form by the
Bureau of Agricultural Economics of the Department of Agriculture, had been
given by Loomis in December 1940 at the annual meeting of the American
Sociological Society in Chicago. In 1980 the Old Town (West) Las Vegas (N. Mex.)
plaza was exactly twenty-six road-miles from El Cerrito.
2. Olen Leonard and C. P. Loomis, Culture of a Contemporary Rural Community: El Cerrito, New Mexico, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Rural Life
Studies 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1941). Both authors are now retired, Leonard in Tucson and Loomis in Las Cruces. Leonard
(letter to author, 25 August 1980) writes that he lived in El Cerrito for seven
months between October 1939 and May 1940. Loomis overlapped with Leonard
in February, March, and April, and he again resided in El Cerrito in June, October,
and November; Loomis to author, 27 December 1980. Leonard and Loomis note
that at one time El Cerrito had been split between two rival families, the "M's"
(for Manzanareses) and the "Q's" (for Quintanas), but that this conflict had ended
with the departure of the M's (El Cerrito, pp. 57, 63). A companion volume of
photographs taken 10-16 April 1941 by Irving Rusinow appeared as A Camera
Report on El Cerrito, A Typical Spanish-American Community in New Mexico,
Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Miscellaneous Publication No. 479 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1942). Leonard drew heavily on his
fieldwork in El Cerrito for his doctoral dissertation at Louisiana State University
(1943), which has been reprinted with only minor modifications as The Role of
the Land Grant in the Social Organization and Social Processes of a SpanishAmerican Village in New Mexico (Albuquerque: Calvin Hom, 1970).
3. Loomis, "El Cerrito, New Mexico: A Changing Village," New Mexico Historical Review 33 Qanuary 1958): 53-75; and Charles P. Loomis, "Systemic Linkage
of El Cerrito," Rural Sociology 24 (March 1959):54-57.
4. I am using the term "Hispano" as a substitute for "Spanish American" or
"Spanish"; those familiar with this subculture know that "Spanish American" and
the Spanish consciousness it represents came to exist in the early decades of the
twentieth century. See Richard L. Nostrand, " 'Mexican American' and 'Chicano':
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Emerging Terms for a People Coming ofAge," Pacific Historical Review 42 (August
1973): 394-96.
5. Manuscript census schedules of 1900 were released in the mid-1970s in
keeping with a seventy-five-year confidentiality policy. Census enumerators in
1900 were apparently instructed to ignore the one or several villages that may
have existed within their precincts, and although aggregate data can be determined for all precincts, such data can be tabulated only for a relatively small
number of Hispano villages identified by especially conscientious enumerators.
Fortunately, in the headings for all three census schedules labeled Precinct 37,
Nestor Sena, the forty-four-year-old "day laborer" from San Jose who took the
census in El Cerrito, wrote "El Cerrito" in the blank spaces following the "incorporated city, town, or village" being enumerated, thus signaling that data
aggregates for El Cerrito and Precinct 37 would be one and the same (U. S.,
Department of Commerce, Bureau Of the Census, Twelfth Census of the United
States: 1900, Population, New Mexico vol. 1, [Washington, D. C.: National Archives Microfilm Publications, n.d.], Microcopy No. T-623, roll 1002, San Miguel
County, Enumeration District 108, Precinct 37, pp. 147a, 147b, 148a).
6, The census reveals that no family in 1900 was without its male head of
household. Whether entire families were temporarily away from the village is not
known, but if so the number would have been small (Twelfth Census: 1900, T623, roll 1002, pp. 147a, 147b, 148a).
7. The removal of a few families in El Cerrito from the village to the mesa
seems to have occurred after 1916 when mesa land was opened to homesteading.
Families that homesteaded mesa land did live on their claims at least long enough
to obtain patents (Leonard and Loomis, EI Cerrito, p. 15).
8. Leonard and Loomis, EI Cerrito, p. 15.
9. They may well have employed more than the eight stock herders. This
analysis is based only on heads of household and ignores thirteen sons or sonsin-law whose occupations were stock herder (seven), day laborer (four), farmer
(one), and stock raiser (one). One widowed daughter was also a laundrywoman
(Twelfth Census: 1900, T-623, roll 1002, pp. 147a, 147b, 148a).
10. Leonard and Loomis, EI Cerrito, p. 13. In 1900 schooling was in Spanish.
The census schedules reveal that not one of the 136 villagers could speak English
(Twelfth Census:1900, T-623, roll 1002, pp. 147a, 147b, 148a).
11. Leonard and Loomis, EI Cerrito, p. 23.
12. Leonard and Loomis, EI Cerrito, p. 70.
13. The General Land Office Record of Patents, Private Land Claims Docket
No. 119, New Mexico, dated 6 January 1910, and available at the Bureau of Land
Management, Santa Fe, gives the figure 5,147.73 acres. Leonard noted the figures
5,024 of some 400,000 acres on pp. 48, 105, and on p. 104 he documented the
figure 315,300 acres in his Role of the Land Grant. By mistake, Leonard and
Loomis gave the date as 1901 in EI Cerrito, p. 4; see note 15 below.
14. The existence of ten villages in 1900 was noted in Leonard, Role of the
Land Grant, pp. 49, 105.
15. Plat of the San Miguel del Bado Grant, Tracts 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and
10, as surveyed by Wendell V. Hall, 9 December 1902-8 February 1903, approved
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by the Court of Private Land Claims on 14 June 1904, available at the Bureau of
Land Management, Santa Fe. Tract No.1 was El Cerrito's grant. Tract No.2 is
shown in the Villanueva 15-minute quadrangle map, United States Geological
Survey, 1960. Water rights to 113.34 acres were adjudicated in the Hope Decree
of 1933 and are shown in the Pecos Hydrographic Survey Map Sheet No. A-15,
May 1922. These latter documents are available at the State Engineer's Office in
Santa Fe.
16. Leonard and Loomis, EI Cerrito, p. 14.
17. Leonard and Loomis, EI Cerrito, pp. 6, 21; quote on p. 6.
18. Leonard and Loomis, EI Cerrito, p. 6.
19. Leonard, Role of the Land Grant, pp. 116, 138.
20. Leonard and Loomis, EI Cerrito, pp. 4, 12, 60, 69.
21. Leonard and Loomis, EI Cerrito, pp. 6, 32, 35.
22. Leonard and Loomis, EI Cerrito, pp. 33, 60.
23. Loomis to author, 12 August 1980.
24. Loomis to author, 12 August 1980. Thus, in 1940 there were twenty-six
permanent and nonresident families in El Cerrito. Leonard and Loomis, EI Cerrito, p. 7, noted that two families had moved permanently from the village in the
fifteen years prior to 1940, explaining some of the decrease from the thirty families
reported in the 1900 census. Leonard noted that six families had moved permanently from the village, but no time frame was given (Role of the Land Grant,
p. 117).
25. Leonard and Loomis, EI Cerrito, p. 14.
26. Leonard and Loomis, EI Cerrito, pp. 8, 41.
27. Leonard and Loomis, EI Cerrito, pp. 14, 21. The smallest one-family irrigated tract and house lot was one-fourth acre (p. 21).
28. Three families lived on their mesa land (Leonard, Role of the Land Grant,
p. 115). Leonard and Loomis emphasize that family and community ties were so
strong in El Cerrito that removing to the mesa meant great family hardships (EI
Cerrito, p. 46; see note 7 above.)
29. Leonard and Loomis, EI Cerrito, pp. 28, 31; quote on p. 31. Leonard
characterizes these employees as part-time laborers in Role of the Land Grant,
p. 142.
30. Leonard and Loomis, EI Cerrito, p. 52.
31. Leonard and Loomis, EI Cerrito, p. 72. Located three miles up the Pecos,
Villanueva was the nearest village to El Cerrito, yet it was sixteen miles away
(apparently in one direction) by automobile (EI Cerrito, pp. 37, 68). (In 1980 the
road distance to Villanueva was exactly eight miles: 6.2 dirt and 1.8 paved.) A
state law now required that only English be spoken in schools, a regulation that
was not always adhered to (EI Cerrito, p. 52). The school's primary function was
considered to be teaching English, and by 1940 many villagers knew English, yet
seldom did a local child attaiu allY degree of proficiency in it (EI Cerrito, pp. 30,
52).
32. Leonard and Loomis, EI Cerrito, p. 54. The priest came once a month
from Villanueva.
33. Leonard and Loomis, EI Cerrito, pp. 21, 28, 31.
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34. Leonard and Loomis, El Cerrito, pp. 21, 24, 28.
35. Leonard and Loomis, El Cerrito, pp. 20, 33, 45, 60, 72.
36. Leonard and Loomis, El Cerrito, pp. 7, 8, 9, 15, 20, 21, 34.
37. Data for El Cerrito and the nearby village of El Pueblo were aggregated
in Table 2 by Loomis in his survey of wartime village emigration conducted in
1942, and so one cannot say how many El Cerrito 'villagers had taken what jobs
where. Some villagers had also joined the armed forces (Loomis, "Wartime Migration from the Rural Spanish Speaking Villages of New Mexico," Rural Sociology
7 [December 1942]: 386, 390, 391, 393).
38. Loomis, "Systemic Linkage," p. 54.
39. Loomis, "El Cerrito," pp. 55, 66, 68, 72, 74. El Cerrito was also apparently
restudied in 1949 by Frank E. Wilson in an unpublished study entitled "El Cerrito:
A Changing Culture." Several authors including John Burma, Juan Hernandez,
and Leo Grebler et aI., cite this elusive manuscript as a master's thesis filed in
1949 at New Mexico Highlands University in Las Vegas. In May 1949 Wilson was
awarded a master's degree with a major in Latin American Civilization at NMHU,
but that institution's registrar reported in 1980 that no thesis was noted in Wilson's
record, and its library has no record of the thesis. Lynn 1. Perrigo, professor
emeritus of history at the school, recalls that the study was a paper in one of his
seminars, but he has no record of it (Perrigo to author, 4 April 1980).
40. Loomis, "El Cerrito," p. 55; and Loomis, "Systemic Linkage," p. 54.
41. Loomis, "Systemic Linkage," pp. 54, 56; quote on p. 56.
42. Loomis, "El Cerrito," pp. 71-72.
43. Interview with Margie Quintana, 29 March 1980.
44. The information about Anglos in El Cerrito was obtained in numerous
interviews during 1980 with Jack and Heidi Lanstra, El Cerrito's permanent Anglo
couple. Originally from the states of Washington and Hawaii, they met while
students at New Mexico Highlands University in Las Vegas.
45. Interviews with Jack and Heidi Lanstra, 31 March, 2 April, 12 August 1980.
Land purchased by the first of these parties was later sold to other Anglos, and
their one solar was sold back to villagers. The second party to purchase in El
Cerrito acquired two solares, explaining why seven are now owned by Anglos as
noted below. I was unable to verify the dates of 1965 and 1968 in the County
Assessor's, Clerk's, or Treasurer's offices in the San Miguel County Courthouse
in Las Vegas.
46. No records seem to exist showing the number and location of the solares.
Attempts were made to locate such records at the San Miguel County Courthouse
in Las Vegas and through interviews with Locario Huertado of San Miguel (26
April 1980) and Tobias Flores ofVillanueva (17 May 1980), president and treasurer,
respectively, of the San Miguel del Bado Grant Commission.
47. Of the nine Hispano villagers, the three oldest understood but spoke very
little English. Of the remaining six, five were bilingual, but one was more comfortable in Spanish, and another, who had grown up in Pueblo, was more comfortable in English; the one child spoke English almost exclusively.
48. The community well had been dug in 1949 (Loomis, "El Cerrito," p. 6061). The mayordomo de acequias owned land in El Cerrito but lived in Los Alamos.
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A strong feeling of interdependence and cooperation existed among the villagers,
and there was an absence of friction between Hispanos and Anglos. On 17 May
1980, for example, Luis Roberto Aragon, a village rancher-farmer, and Linda
Quintana, both of Pueblo, were married in the first wedding to be held in EI
Cerrito since 1958, and Jack and Heidi Lanstra, the Anglos, were best man and
matron of honor.
49. These were the active nonresident families who owned and maintained
their village homes. The three Anglos were among the party of six Anglos and
three Hispanos who had bought land in EI Cerrito. There were also a dozen
inactive nonresident parties among whom were several Anglos; most had water
rights, and half owned houses that were vacant or in ruins.
50. In 1980, fifteen parties were registered users of irrigation water in the
village (interview with Jack and Heidi Lanstra, 12 August 1980). As in 1956,
nonresidents who did not use their arable lands sometimes leased them to the
residents (Loomis, "Systemic Linkage," p. 57). Altogether, the villagers owned
some 3,500 to 3,800 mesa land acres in 1980, but none owned sheep.
51. For example, on Easter Sunday (6 April) in 1980, twelve people, only five
of whom were permanent villagers, attended church. Of the seven from outside
the village, four were from Los Alamos, two were from Las Vegas, and one was
from Pueblo. This pattern of villagers returning to El Cerrito when possible also
occurred in 1956 (Loomis, "El Cerrito," p. 66).
52. El Cerrito's school has also almost disappeared. It was closed in the early
1950s, after which children were bussed to Villanueva (Loomis, "El Cerrito," pp.
59-60).
53. Florencio Quintana, El Cerrito's oldest resident, cannot explain why a
number of village houses adjoined one another in one long row (interview, 12
August 1980). According to Leonard, however, the row of contiguous houses
developed as married sons built homes adjacent to those of their parents (Role
of the Land Grant, pp. 27, 45).
54. Leonard, Role of the Land Grant, p. 48.
55. See comments of villagers in Leonard and Loomis, El Cerrito, p. 34.
56. The twenty-one permanent families in 1940 had some 113 irrigable acres
at their disposal, an average of more than five acres per family. The Amish of
Pennsylvania, also the subject of one of the "Rural Life Studies" of the Department
of Agriculture Bureau of Agricultural Economics in the early 1940s, claimed that
one Amish family could easily make a living on five good irrigated acres. See
comments by Loomis in Loomis and Glen Grisham, "The New Mexican Experiment in Village Rehabilitation," Applied Anthropology 2 (April-June 1943): 16.
57. Leonard, Role of the Land Grant, pp. 149-50.
58. Additional research would probably reveal that the degree of depopulation
in a given village is a function of that village's commuter accessibility to major
centers.

THE THIRD FORT UNION:
ARCHITECTURE, ADOBE, AND THE ARMY*

DWIGHT

T.

PITCAITHLEY

FOLLOWING THE CONFEDERATE REVERSAL at Apache Canyon in
March 1862, Fort Union, New Mexico, entered its third and final
phase. Established in 1851 as a way station on the Santa Fe Trail
and supply depot for southwestern forts, the initial collection of
hastily constructed log huts was augmented ten years later by a
massive (if no less hastily constructed) earthen fort designed in an
eight-pointed "star" configuration. The anticipated Confederate force
under the command of Brig. Gen. H. H. Sibley never reached the
fort, however, and its dank interiors quickly became physically
intolerable and strategically superfluous. Recognizing that neither
the by-now decrepit log fort nor the progressively sodden "star"
fort was adequate for the storage and disbursement of supplies to
New Mexico's military posts, the army promptly approved plans
for a new, greatly expanded post and quartermaster depot that
would satisfy all logistical needs and present a more commanding
appearance than either of its predecessors.!
Designed by Capt. John C. McFerran, chief quartermaster of
the District of New Mexico, and refined by depot quartermaster
Capt. Henry J. Farnsworth, the new complex consisted of three
military entities: the post proper, an elaborate quartermaster depot, and a detached arsenal. The post possessed a row of nine
officers' quarters that faced, across a wide parade ground, four sets
of U-shaped barracks. Behind the barracks were two rectangular
structures with long ells at the north and south ends that housed
the post laundresses, the guardhouse, the prison, the bakery, and
the post quartermaster storerooms. Immediately behind these
0028-6206/82/0400-0123 $1. 50/0
© Regents, University of New Mexico
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buildings were the post corrals. The depot, adjacent to and immediately north of the post, contained a row of six structures that
served as officers' quarters and depot offices. Across another wide
parade ground were an extensive mechanics' corral and, to the
north of it, five large rectangular storehouses. Behind these buildings spread the transportation corral, which serviced teams and
transportation vehicles. The post hospital sat several hundred yards
southeast of the post and constituted a complex of its own with a
steward's quarters, washhouse and kitchen, bathhouse, and assorted other structures. The arsenal was located west of the post
and depot on the site of the first Fort Union.
With its vast array of storehouses, corrals, maintenance facilities,
barracks, and officers' quarters, the third Fort Union, upon its
completion, presented an imposing collection of territorial style
military buildings. The spaciousness of the quarters, the distinctive
facades, and the grand scale of the depot's operation imparted a
heightened sense of determination and purpose, of stability, and
of permanence. Beneath its dramatic exterior, however, the complex possessed structural defects rivaling those of log and earth
forts it replaced. Those defects, and the inability of the army to
remedy them, vexed every commanding officer of the post between
1867 and 1891 and was a far greater irritant to the troops than the
specter of Indian foes. But in 1863, as construction commenced,
the possibility ofthe general deterioration of Fort Union's structures
seemed as remote as the possibility of a railroad between nearby
Las Vegas and Santa Fe.
Work began on the fort in April, but progress was slow. Two
years passed before the completion of the hospital, and not until
early 1867 were the officers' quarters ready for occupancy. Indeed,
it was late 1867 before the post and depot were functional and
operating according to plan. 2 William A. Bell, who viewed the
almost completed post in August 1867, found it a "bustling place."
It is the largest military establishment to be found on the plains,
'and is the supply centre from which the forty or fifty lesser forts
scattered all over the country within a radius of 500 miles or more,
are supplied with men, horses, munitions of war, and often with
everything needed for their support. It is not in the least fortified,
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as, of course, such a precaution would be useless; but it is a vast
collection of workshops, storehouses, barracks, officers' quarters,
and offices of all kinds belonging to the different departments. The
dwellings, although built, as are all the other buildings, of sun-dried
bricks, are most comfortable[.] They are roofed with thin iron sheeting, covered with earth. The rooms of the officers are lofty and wellfurnished. The hospital, containing about 120 beds, is a very fine
building, to which two resident surgeons are attached. 3

In spit~ of its complex design, however, the new Fort Union
never possessed several structures usually considered essential to
frontier military life. Throughout its existence, the fort lacked a
school building and a chapel. A structure that would have served
both uses was proposed in February 1867, but Gen. Ulysses S.
Grant rejected the idea with the admonition that "such buildings
should be postposed until the troops had been provided with more
comfortable quarters."4 Religious services and school classes were
consequently conducted in unused rooms in various buildings within
the post. 5 In addition, the army never constructed or apparently
even contemplated a headquarters building for the post. The post
commander occupied an office in the depot quartermaster's office.
Once completed, the structures at Fort Union changed very
little. Only three events modified the use and shape of the fort in
its twenty-five-year existence: the arrival of two additional permanent companies of troops and two devastating fires. On 15 July
1866, Gen. James H. Carleton requested permission to modify the
initial plan of the post so that he could quarter two companies of
infantry troops there along with -the original complement of four
troops of cavalry. 7 The request was approved, but conflicting opinions concerning the desirability of cavalry over infantry garrisons
for frontier service prevented the alterations from taking place until
nine years later. 8 By the mid-1870s, the dilemma had resolved
itself, and in September 1875 depot quartermaster Capt. Amos S.
Kimball prepared plans for augmenting the garrison by two infantry
companies. Kimball proposed converting the unused storeroom
buildings of the post into squadrooms and mess facilities. 9 The plan
received official approval, and the necessary modifications were
completed by the following summer. 10
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Fires in June 1874 and in February 1876 further altered the
appearance of the fort. The earlier blaze destroyed the eastern half
of the transportation corral and prompted its reconstruction on a
much more modest scale. ll The second fire destroyed the depot's
detached lumber yard and machine shop; it did not, however,
damage the steam engine which, along with the salvaged and repaired woodworking equipment, was relocated in the southwest
corner of the depot mechanics' corral. 12 Following these structural
modificatiqns, the fort remained relatively unchanged until the late
1880s when several structures were dismantled because of their
deteriorated condition. 13
Indeed, from their completion in the 1860s until their abandonment in 1891, the fort's adobe structures were in an almost constant
state of deterioration. The territorial style of architecture proved
to be inadequate on the exposed plains of eastern New Mexico.
The flat, tin-covered roofs could not provide sufficient protection
from the wind-driven rain and hail storms that plagued the level,
open country. As a result, cracks developed, water seeped through
the roofs and walls into the adobe, walls separated from the roofs
and threatened to collapse, and floors and foundations rotted. Two
additional factors hastened the decline of the structures: the inability of the troops to perform the necessary repairs at a time when
strict economy measures prohibited the employment of citizen
craftsmen and a pronounced unwillingness on the part of army
officialdom to appropriate sufficient funds for annual maintenance.
Because the structural decay was apparent as early as 1867 and
continued throughout the life of the post, its causes warrant further
analysis.
When Capt. John Courts McFerran, chief quartermaster of the
District of New Mexico, prepared the initial plans of Fort Union,
he indicated that all structures were to have shingled roofs, which
by definition would be pitched. 14 But on 26 April 1863 General
Carleton requested that the roofs of the new fort be covered with
tin, reasoning that "tin occasionally painted, will last for a great
many years, [and] is secure against water and against fire. "15 Authority for the change was soon forthcoming, but the redesigned
roofs possessed a mere six-inch pitch. 16 The tin panels that covered
the roofs were soldered together and finally painted in an attempt
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to protect the metal and to create a waterproof seal. 17 The army
failed on both counts. Almost from the beginning the paint peeled,'
the solder cracked,· the tin panels separated, and water seeped into
the walls and the ceiling plaster. IS
Lydia Spencer Lane, wife of commanding officer Maj. William
B. Lane, experienced the effects of the faulty roofs one evening as
she prepared a dinner for seventeen. Just after she called her guests
to the table and turned to make a final adjustment to the setting,
she heard an "ominous crack." Before she could move, the plaster
ceiling collapsed dealing her no physical harm but "filling every
dish with plaster to the top. "19 Similar experiences occurred later
in the fort's history, but Mrs. Lane's misfortune is memorable because the commanding officer's quarters had recently been completed.
Throughout its twenty-five-year campaign to solve the problem
of leaking roofs, the army tried coating the tin panels with ordinary
paint, with asbestos paint, and finally with a combination of coal
tar and sand. 20 While each application may have been temporarily
successful, the result was always the same. Three years after Lydia
Lane's evening of embarrassment, the district quartermaster reported that "all the roofs leak more or less. "21 From then until 1891,
the occupants of the fort enjoyed only sporadic relief as the roofs
continued to deteriorate. 22 Perhaps it was because of the sodden
condition of the buildings in 1875 that assistant surgeon Peter Moffatt was prompted to inquire whether adobe quarters were a "fruitful source not only of rheumatism, but sciatica, and other forms of
Neuralgia. "23
The incessant wind that harassed the fort and regularly preyed
on wooden privies, woodsheds, sections of adobe walls, the post
flagstaff, gates, and portions of the tin roofs hastened the decline
of the buildings. In early November 1885, for instance, sentry box
no. 1 blew away in a blizzard. 25 During dry periods, blowing sand
accompanied the driving winds. The powdery substance not only
filtered into the quarters and lodged "round the windows and doors
in little yellow mounds," but also accumulated in drifts large enough
to obstruct the road leading into the shop and warehouse area of
the depot. 26 So severe was the problem in 1872 that the depot
quartermaster requested permission to build an adobe wall across
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the northwest side of the depot grounds. 27 Authority was not forthcoming, however, and the drifts continued to pose problems for
everyone except the post children. 28
The cumulative effect of violent rain, hail, and wind storms on
the structures soon became readily apparent. As early as August
1869, exterior plaster began to fall off. Despite the temporary success of a coating of "yellow wash," 1st Lt. John Wesley Pullman,
depot quartermaster, reported four years later that "the buildings
are of adobes and[,] bare from all plasteringL] suffer more or less
by each rain. . . ." Pullman further observed that if they were not
quickly plastered, some of the structures would "be liable to fall
down in less than one year. "29 The structures did not fall, but
neither were they completely repaired. By the mid-1880s, water
damage to many of the structures was so great that walls had to be
supported by logs. In 1886, Col. Henry Douglass, after an annual
inspection, reported that:
the adobe buildings at this post were originally plastered on the
exterior to protect them from the washings of the violent storms
which prevail here during the summer. This plaster has fallen off,
leaving the walls exposed to the weather. There is a heavy brick
coping on top of the walls and the wall underneath becomes furrowed and hollowed out, weakening the walls very much, and the
superincumbent weight of the coping renders the wall very insecure.
Corners of buildings crack and fall out, whole sides of buildings fall
out, occasionally. 30

Indeed, during an inspection six months later, the side wall of a
squadroom separated from the roof and threatened to collapse until
the troops pushed it back into place and braced it with "heavy
timbers. "31
Avigorous program of regular maintenance could have prevented
some of the major structural problems at the post had it not been
for an interesting paradox: during the summer months-the season
in which structural repairs could most easily be made-the garrison
was on patrol and absent from the fort. 32 It was the army's preference to have troops rather than skilled civilian labor perform

Mechanics Corral at Fort Union in the 1860s.

Mechanics Corral at Fort Union in the 1870s. National Archives photographs. Courtesy of
Fort Union National Museum.
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repairs to the structures. But not only were the troops regularly
unavailable to work on the buildings; they also lacked the technical
expertise needed to curtail the structural decline of Fort Union.
In 1870, for example, commanding officer J. Irvin Gregg recommended that a "competent Mechanic or Architect be directed to
examine the buildings" because Gregg did not "know of any repairs
that can be made that will check this tendency [of the adobe walls
settling outward]."33 Three years later depot quartermaster Pullman requested permission to hire four masons, two painters, and
one carpenter to perform urgently needed repairs. He argued that
the work could be accomplished in half the time (and at only a
slightly additional cost) than if it were done by troops.34 With a
classic display of army intransigence, the army's Quartermaster
General, Brig. Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs, denied the request
and replied that:
if troops cannot keep buildings they occupy from tumbling down,
then the law of Congress is inoperative. I do not think it impossible
for a company ofAmerican troops to take care of their own quarters.
The people of a Mexican village, less educated-not more aptbuild their villages without recourse to the outside world, and even
provide all the material, to shelter themselves. 35
Thus, during the 1880s, troops imperfectly accomplished needed
repairs without the aid of civilian skilled labor, and the buildings
continued to deteriorate. By 1886, the condition of the buildings
was so poor that the commanding officer again requested authority
to hire "a citizen tin-smith for repairing leaky roofs, a citizen mason
to repair walls and a citizen carpenter to repair wood work. "36 But
the request was never honored, and in 1890, following a specially
ordered inspection, Col. Eugene A. Carr pronounced the fort "totally unfit for habitation."37 The following year Fort Union was
abandoned.
While the structures at Fort Union suffered from poor design
and ineffective maintenance, they suffered equally from the belief
of numerous high-ranking army officers that the sprawling complex
was extravagant, expensive, and of little strategic importance. Beginning in 1870, these officials recommended that first the depot
and later the post should be abandoned. 38 When Col. Randolph B.
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Marcy, inspector general of the army, visited the post during the
summer of 1867, he expressed surprise at "the elaborate and expensive character of the buildings that have been and are now
being erected at this post. . ." and further stated that the depot's
officers' quarters were "far better than any officers' quarters that I
have seen at any other frontier post. "39 During a subsequent inquiry
into alleged unauthorized construction at Fort Union, Col. William
A. Nichols, assistant adjutant general of the Division of the Missouri, more pointedly observed that "the post has been costly beyond its true value, and whilst severe economy has been necessary
elsewhere, it was very wrong to be lavishing money there."4o Two
years later in 1869, Lt. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, commanding
officer, Division of the Missouri, caustically remarked that Fort
Union "has grown into proportions which never at any time were
warranted by the wants of the public service. Quartermasters and
Commanding Officers have gone on increasing and building up an
unnecessary post, until it has become by the unnecessary waste of
public money, an eye sore. "41 Following that censorious appraisal,
Brig. Gen. Edward D. Townsend, adjutant general of the army,
ordered a halt to any additional construction. 42
Perhaps the most conspicuous manifestation of this adverse viewpoint was the steady reduction of funds available for the maintenance of the buildings. Commanding officers of Fort Union after
1870 found it increasingly difficult to obtain funds even for minor
repairs. In 1874, Maj. Andrew Jonathan Alexander summed up the
sentiments of a number of commanding officers when, after requesting funds for repairs, he concluded, "I feel that it is a hopeless
task to attempt to get any money for this purpose but I represent
the facts as part of my duty. "43
Underlying the problem of structural deterioration at Fort Union
was that beginning in the early 1870s, the strategic importance of
the fort, as a depot and as a military outpost, began to diminish.
Although during the first few years of its existence the third fort
was the primary collection and distribution point for other forts in
New Mexico, by 1872 supply trains from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, had taken over the role and regularly hauled their stores directly to the territory's other postS. 44 Fort Union thereafter
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occasionally provided supplies to those posts but only on an emergency basis. 45 This diminution of the fort's logistical responsibilities
affected directly the form and use of the fort's buildings. For example, the reconstruction of the transportation corral following the
fire of 1874 reflected a significant reduction in the demands being
placed upon it. 46 Furthermore, as the need for the Fort Union
depot continued to decline, one of the extraneous warehouses became a gymnasium, bowling alley, and pistol range. 47
The extension of the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railroad
to Las Vegas in 1879 greatly accelerated the gradual erosion of the
post's strategic importance. The railroad thereafter shipped supplies destined for New Mexico's forts, and the need for the services
offered by the Fort Union depot no longer existed. 48 Indeed, the
coming ofthe railroad marked the passing of an era. Freight wagons
no longer creaked over the Santa Fe Trail and into Fort Union to
be repacked or repaired. The spirited industry that characterized
the depot during its initial years of operation had vanished. The
post stood plaintive and muted, neglected by its creator and rendered obsolete by America's transportation revolution. Yet the territory's military commanders continually thwarted efforts to abandon
the fort. Fort Union lingered on for an additional twelve years and
at the end represented nothing more than a decaying relic from
another age.
Although the army designed the fort on an elaborate scale and
heavily financed it during the initial stages of construction, the
third Fort Union became merely another unwanted western fort
shortly after its construction. Haunted by official neglect and hostility, ineffective roofs, incessant winds, and drenching seasonal
rains, the fort fought and lost a twenty-five-year battle against
continuously foundering adobe structures. When the army finally
and officially abandoned the fort in 1891, it was literally a shell of
its former self. Many of the buildings had been abandoned for years,
and the remainder were only marginally habitable. The troops who
marched away from Fort Union on 15 May 1891 left behind a post
that had clearly outlived its usefulness and that, for a variety of
reasons, had been relegated to spend its last years as a fronter
outpost in ignominious decay.
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NO "BED OF ROSES":
THE CAREERS OF FOUR MESCALERO
INDIAN AGENTS, 1871-1878

HANA SAMEK

CORRUPT AND INCOMPETENT. Such was the label pinned on many
civilian Indian agents appointed under President Grant's Peace
Policy after the Civil War. Few historians have challenged this
image. l Consequently, despite the increasing interest in the study
of Indian-white relations, the Indian agent in western history remains the "bad guy." A look at the tangled affairs at the Mescalero
Apache reservation in New Mexico's Lincoln County from 1871 to
1878 puts into perspective the accusations that dogged four agents.
The key role in the careers of the agents was plcIyed by the
Murphy Company, run by three ex-army men, Maj. Lawrence G.
Murphy, Col. Emil Fritz, and James J. Dolan. In the late 1860s
they established a store and an Indian trading post at Fort Stanton
and soon dominated the economy and politics of Lincoln County.2
Major Murphy is usually given credit for his company's imaginative practices, yet he remains an enigma. He served for several
months as Mescalero agent during the incarceration of the tribe at
Fort Sumner in the mid 1860s. When sober, he apparently could
be charming; on other occasions, however, his heavy drinking made
him unpredictable and belligerent. Some maintain that because of
Murphy's weakness, the pragmatic Emil Fritz handled the business
of the company until he departed in 1873. Then the equally hardnosed "Jimmie" Dolan took over, and in 1876 clerk John H. Riley
became his partner. 3
In 1869 after their release from Fort Sumner, the Mescaleros
settled near Fort Stanton. 4 Supplies needed for the Indians and
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the military opened the way for a lucrative business. The Murphy
Company recognized that to prosper, it must ensure that a pliable
or at least a sympathetic agent be in charge of the reservation.
Therefore, beginning January 1869, Murphy, Fritz, and Capt. Paul
Dowlin, one of Murphy's many army friends, launched a drive to
control the agency by fair or foul means-mainly foul.
They petitioned for the replacement of Mescalero agent Lorenzo
Labadi by Capt. Saturnino Baca, another army acquaintance. A
year later Murphy (by this time a probate judge), Fritz, and yet
another army friend-Capt. C. M. McKibbin from Fort Stantonsigned a second petition for the appointment of Paul Dowlin as
Indian agent. In 1871 Murphy made several appeals, this time for
the appointment of Maj. William Brady, still another army friend,
as agent. s
Murphy felt "emboldened" to point out in a letter to the commissioner of Indian affairs that he had spent more than $1,500 of
his money to make peace with the Mescaleros, that he knew the
Indians because he had served for nine months as their agent at
Fort Sumner, and that the commissioner could be sure settlers
would do everything possible to make the reservation a success.
Mter learning that the Reverend John C. Lowrie, head of the
Presbyterian mission board, had already nominated Andrew J. Curtis as the next agent, Murphy nevertheless felt confident that the
commissioner would surely override this appointment. 6 All petitions failed, but if Murphy and his friends harbored any resentment
against the new agent, they at first concealed their feelings.
Curtis originally came from New York and arrived with his wife
at the agency at Fort Stanton in June 1871. In his first report he
praised the company and said he was indebted to Judge Murphy
and Emil Fritz for initiating him into the intricacies ofIndian affairs.
These men, Curtis wrote, were friends of Chief Cadette and solely
responsible for coaxing the Mescaleros onto the reservation. 7
But Curtis soon discovered he was indebted to the company in
other ways. Since the government did not provide any agency
buildings, he had to rent a part of the Murphy store as his headquarters. Before his arrival, moreover, Indian Superintendent for
New Mexico, Nathaniel Pope, made a contract with the Murphy
firm to provide beef and corn for the Mescaleros. 8 This arrange-
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ment, coupled with Murphy's charming helpfulness, his acquaintance with the Indians and their trust in him, the firm's economic
monopoly, and the bewilderment of the novice agent, set a pattern
of dangerous dependence on the company for succeeding agents.
This situation invited fraud. The commOn scheme involved submitting vouchers for nonexistent Indians or undelivered supplies.
The agents thus could become accomplices of Murphy's firm or
perpetrators of fraud by certifying false vouchers. Their position,
however, was complicated. They depended on Murphy and his
successors for prompt delivery of supplies to prevent Indian raids
on cattle and to keep their charges on the reservation, but the
government frequently made inadequate appropriations, and the
agents had to buy emergency supplies from the company. They
then incurred bureaucratic wrath for making unauthorized expenditures. The comings and goings of the Mescaleros also complicated the situation. The agents never knew how many Indians
were on the reservation or how many would show up at next issu~.
Consequently, annual estimates and needs at issue time proved to
be a guessing game, and these actions aroused the suspicions of
casual observers.
First suspicious signs started to appear about a year after Curtis's
arrival. In 1871 he claimed he had 325 Indians, but by fall of 1872
this number mushroomed to 1,895. In June 1872 the agent forwarded to Superintendent Pope the proposal by Murphy to become
permanent supplier for the Mescaleros. Murphy promised to deliver one pound of beef and corn at 8¢ per head per day. Pope and
Curtis gave their hearty approval, citing this system as preferable
to contracting since no storage space existed, the number ofIndians
was uncertain, and a contract for feeding a specific number of
Indians therefore impossible. Finally, Pope argued, there was the
"entire confidence established between the firm making the offer
and the Indians giving assurance that the latter will be satisfied of
having justice done to them."9
But the government vetoed this monopoly, and the beef contract
went up for bid in October. Immediately, cut-throat competition
developed between two main contenders, Colonel Fritz, whose
bid under his name omitted mention of his relations with Murphy,
and Van C. Smith, a gambler and "sporting man" from Rio Hondo
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(Roswell). Although beef sold at 7¢ a pound, Fritz's bid of 4.5¢ was
higher than Smith's offer of 4.45¢. Smith was clearly the winner,
but Fritz challenged him on the grounds that he would deliver free
salt if awarded the contract. Fritz again called attention to the
Indians' trust and Murphy's peace efforts. Smith responded that
he too would be willing to throw in free salt, but protested that
the contract said nothing about salt. He also showed the absurdity
of Fritz's efforts by pointing out that Fritz could have claimed the
contract just as well by offering to provide free knives and forks
for eating the beef.1° The government agreed, and despite Fritz's
tenacity, Smith retained his beef contract.
In his second annual report Curtis no longer praised or even
mentioned Murphy and his friends. Dispirited, the agent hinted
of resigning. In his final report Curtis had little to say because, he
contended, the government ignored his previous recommendations
for civilizing the Mescaleros and failed to take measures against a
flourishing whiskey traffic. Shortly thereafter, on 15 November, he
tendered his resignation, effective 10 January 1873. 11 But the real
reason for Curtis's discouragement and resignation was the Murphy
Company.
When the new Indian superintendent Col. L. Edwin Dudley
arrived to inspect the agency in December, he found that the
company had "taken entire possession of Indian affairs" and had
relegated the agent to signing their vouchers. Yet he did not blame
Curtis for any irregularities. Dudley explained that the absence of
a government building forced the agent to rely on the company.
He then gave the firm twenty-four hours to vacate the premises.
But for Curtis, the move came too late. One observer stated that
the agent resigned, fearing he would be eventually disgraced. 12
Although Curtis departed under a cloud, his story would soon be
repeated.
Curtis's replacement, Samuel B. Bushnell, launched his brief
but turbulent career in March 1873. Soon after his arrival he became embroiled in a protracted battle with the Murphy firm. In
December Dudley ordered the company to leave, but it ignored
him and, except for the beef contract, resumed its role as Indian
suppliers. Thus ten days after his arrival Bushnell bought from
Fritz $6,000 worth of flour, sugar, and coffee, and at the end of
April an additional $4,500 worth of supplies. These questionable
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purchases led the post surgeon at Fort Stanton to inform the commissioner of Indian affairs that the new agent fed 2,000 nonexistent
Indians, for which he received a gold watch and chain. At the same
time, the surgeon wrote that the agent's son worked for certain
"interested parties," meaning the Murphy Company. He urged the
government to investigate all vouchers before paying any claims. 13
Bushnell, however, had already protested Murphy's activities.
In April he wrote to the Reverend Lowrie that the traders had
"unbounded influence with the Indians" and that it was "necessary
for his own safety, character, and reputation that the agent have
their favor and support. " He stated that he depended on the traders
for everything from the roof over his head to supplies for the Indians
and that he needed more support from the mission board and the
government to establish his independence. 14
A month later, Bushnell complained to Colonel Dudley that he
received vouchers from the company only for his endorsement.
Murphy threatened, Bushnell stated, that he would tum the Mescaleros loose, boasting that they would spare his property. Bushnell
wrote that "Jimmie" Dolan claimed to supply 2,679 Indians, an
increase in the Mescalero population, the agent observed, "which
leaves rabbits, rats and mice in the shade." Dudley, however, was
less critical. He assured the commissioner that the exaggerated
number of Indians was not as great as Bushnell charged, noted that
the Murphy firm had "always" dominated agency affairs, and expressed doubts that it would stir up trouble. 15
Three days later, Bushnell frantically wrote to Dudley that Murphy had ordered the seizure of Van C. Smith's cattle destined for
the reservation. Although Smith had held his contract since October 1872, the Murphy Company furnished cattle on his behalf.
In May, however, Smith took over delivery, much to the displeasure
of the company. Bushnell feared that the firm would try to prevent
delivery, thus forcing Smith to forfeit his contract and putting the
Murphy firm back into the beef business. Although Murphy did
not instigate the seizure, he benefited from this incident when
Bushnell had to make an emergency purchase of nearly $3,000
worth of beef from the company. 16
Perhaps to appease his superiors, Dudley proceeded to hold
Bushnell accountable for this incident. He castigated the agent for
making private inquiries about the amount of issue the company
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delivered. He also condemned Bushnell's emergency purchase from
the company, pointing out, somewhat superfluously, that Van C.
Smith was the only authorized beef contractor. Since the Murphy
Company distributed Indian supplies from its store, Dudley ordered Bushnell to set up his own storage, even after the agent
explained no storage room was available at the fort. 17
In June 1873 the superintendent finally purchased the Murphy
building in order to force the company from Fort Stanton. This act
encouraged Bushnell. He wrote to the commissioner that he had
suffered through a "terrible ordeal," in which Murphy sold whiskey
to the Indians, held up the agent for contempt, and countermanded
his orders. Even if Bushnell refused to endorse the supplies, Murphy issued them, and the agent signed the vouchers under protest
to avoid a breach of contract suit against the government. He urged
the commissioner to invalidate half of Dolan's and Fritz's vouchers,
pointing out that they acted on behalf of the Murphy Company.
Bushnell was confident that he had barely avoided falling into the
same trap as Curtis and was sure that he had destroyed the Murphy
firm and the Indian Ring in New Mexico. 18 Indeed, during this
time the company appeared to suffer a serious blow when as a
result of the "Randlett affair," involving Dolan's assault on one of
the army officers, the War Department removed Major Murphy as
post trader. 29
But the true state of affairs came to light in the summer when
Maj. William Redwood Price visited the agency to put an end to
Indian cattle raids. 20 Price immediately recognized that Murphy
controlled the agency and the Indians. Murphy summoned the
Mescaleros, gave them presents, and urged Price to talk to them
to ascertain their satisfaction with the situation. When Price requested Bushnell to call in Chief Roman, Bushnell replied that he
would ask Murphy to bring him in. Price reminded the agent that
he was the only authority, not Major Murphy. This reminder lifted
Bushnell's confidence sufficiently that he started complaining that
all agency goods were invoiced and received by the company, that
it controlled the issue, and that he could not establish the number
of the Indians. The firm claimed to supply 2,500 Indians, but Price
thought only 500 were on the reservation. During Price's stay,
Murphy and the Indians drank heavily. While intoxicated, Murphy
made deranged statements, threatening to send the Mescaleros
back to the mountains if he could not retain control over them. 21
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Price's findings should have sounded familiar to the officials.
Bushnell complained to the commissioner and to the Presbyterian
board that he received no support, which forced him to submit to
"rascality, dishonesty and highhanded corruption." In one letter
he asked pointedly: "does the government of the U. S. amount to
anything?" He stated that all his reports to Washington fell into the
hands of the Murphy people, who retaliated by spreading rumors
that the agent did not get along with the Mescaleros and that the
Indians were threatening to leave the reservation. 22
Even after the company sold its building, it refused to leave,
and Dudley had to step in again to dislodge the firm. Thus, Bushnell
wrote, from his arrival in April until September he depended "upon
outside parties for every necessary [sic]. . . . " But the Murphy
Company again foiled officials. While the firm relocated in Lincoln
after losing the post tradership, James Dolan acquired the Indian
tradership, which in effect became Murphy's branch store. Then
the War Department played into the company's hands by appointing as post trader Murphy's old friend, Paul Dowlin. 23
Even Dudley believed that the company's influence was not
diminished. Knowing that Van C. Smith's contract would expire in
October, Dudley asked the government to let his contract stand
for another six months. In Lincoln, the firm controlled the farmers
and ranchers, wrote Dudley, and therefore it was impossible to
obtain a contract the firm did not control. He warned that Murphy
intended to regain the contract even if it meant offering to supply
beef at less than 2¢ per pound. The government, overlooking the
reports of the past three years, rejected Dudley's proposal. 24
But agent Bushnell did not remain to enjoy even a partial victory.
In September 1874 Major Price arrested several Mescaleros as
hostages until stolen cattle were returned. Immediately the rest
of the Indians fled from the reservation. Dudley, seeing this as
another sign of Bushnell's inability to control his charges or to resist
the Murphy firm, decided to remove Bushnell despite his belief
in the agent's honesty. When Price learned of the dismissal, he
chalked up Bushnell as another victim of Murphy machinations. 25
The third agent, Williamson D. Crothers, arrived in April 1874
and soon discovered that Dudley's actions had not improved conditions at the agency. 26 The new post trader, Paul Dowlin, rented
a part of the old Murphy building, while the agent occupied the
remainder. Dowlin's business included selling whiskey to the In-
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dians, who slowly drifted back to the reservation. Outraged, Crothers demanded that the post commander, Maj. D. R. Clendenin,
put an end to the illegal trade. But Dowlin sold whiskey that
Murphy supplied, and Clendenin was one of the officers who enjoyed the firm's hospitality towards the army brass. Although Clendenin responded to Crothers's request to end the whiskey traffic,
he also told the agent that he occupied the agency building at the
pleasure of the War Department since it stood on a military post. 27
In January 1875 Clendenin ordered the seizure of the building.
At the same time a flurry of letters from Fort Stanton informed
officials that Crothers's son used Indian supplies in his "house of
entertainment" and that he ran the agency, his father having been
absent since December. Furthermore, the letters complained that
Crothers was too old, feared the Indians, and refused to enter their
camps. These accusations from the military came barely three months
after charges had been filed against Crothers for operating a hotel
without a license. One of the signers of these charges was Major
Murphy. 28
In the meantime relations between the agent and the military
deteriorated further. The army failed to protect the Mescaleros
from raids on their horses, so in January the Indians moved closer
to the fort for protection. There, under the noses of the army, they
were attacked again. Fearing further reprisals, they fled to the
mountains. The army considered this action a breakout and mounted
a vigorous campaign against the Mescaleros. Although a special
investigator cleared Crothers of this incident and even praised his
work, he recommended changes in the "internal affairs" of the
agency. 29
Crothers knew all along that Major Murphy was trying to remove
him, but he felt confident that he had enough proof of his integrity
to foil the attempt. Twice Crothers physically removed the agency
to keep the Indians from Murphy's whiskey. This decision and other
actions continued to annoy the company. In August 1874 cattle
baron John Simpson Chisum underbid the company at $1.95 per
pound to win the coveted beef contract for the agency. In the spring
of 1875 a ranchers' convention successfully challenged the MurphyDolan Democrats, and Murphy shortly thereafter resigned his post
as probate judge. 30
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It appeared for a time that Crothers had won his struggle with
Murphy when a grand jury refused to indict him on the hotel
charges and the commissioner cleared him of responsibility in the
attacks on the Mescaleros. Then, however, the War Department
brought its charges of "dereliction of duty." By this time Crothers
must have concluded that the job was not worth the aggravation.
He resigned in February 1876, citing poor health ~nd death in the
family as reasons. 31
That year several new persons who gained immortality during
the Lincoln County war arrived. John H. Riley became a partner
of Dolan when poor health forced Major Murphy to retire. The
adventurous Englishman John H. Tunstall came to Lincoln to join
lawyer Alexander A. McSween and cattleman John S. Chisum.
Tunstall was preceded by the new Mescalero agent, Frederick C.
Godfroy. Although the spectacular violence involving Billy the Kid
obscured Godfroy's role, it was the economic control of the agency
and the agent that pitted the Murphy and Tunstall factions against
each other. 32
Godfroy began as a conscientious, enthusiastic agent, flooding
the Indian Department with reports and requests. When he arrived
he found his agency in a rented building at Blazer's Mill, swept
bare of all food, blankets, and clothing for the Indians. He requested emergency funds for necessities a~d asked especially for
a weight scale since he depended on the. Indian traders, one of
whom was Riley, to weigh the issue. When the government did
not respond, Godfroy made his purchases and submitted the bill.
This action brought a stern warning from the commissioner not to
make unauthorized expenditures or the government would repudiate the vouchers. 33
Godfroy took heed. In January he reported he sold to agency
employees and to settlers 1,200 pounds ofbeefleft over at the end
of the month. He pointed out that since the contract called for a
fixed amount, he save.d the government money by selling the surplus. Such a transaction, however, aroused suspicions that continued to haunt his administration.
In his first annual report Godfroy praised the Mescaleros, but
he was far less impressed with the white settlers who resided on
the reservation. Godfroy tried to prevent these Anglos from selling
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whiskey to the Indians, to put an end to raids against Indian horses,
and to prevent damage to Indian fields from wagon-trains passing
through the reservation. Godfroy concluded, prophetically, that his
position was no "bed of roses."35
During the winter of 1876 a smallpox epidemic swept the reservation, killing a number ofApaches and incapacitating the agent
from 16 February to 6 March. During Godfroy's illness, agency
clerk Morris J. Bernstein took charge. Although Bernstein was
evidently nonpartisan, he had worked at one time for Dolan, and
his behavior as acting agent was suspect. 36
In his estimate of expenditures for 1877-78 Bernstein made extravagant demands. He urged the appropriation of$8,000 for clothing and utensils; and 1,642,000 pounds of beef and 547,500 pounds
of flour, amounting to $69,063.25. He explained that although he
had expected the arrival of 500 more Indians, he now must raise
the estimate to a thousand. He urged that all food be purchased
in Lincoln County, explaining that such an act would give local
farmers and ranchers an opportunity to bid on government contractsY Bernstein must have known, however, that the Murphy
firm maintained virtual monopoly over such contracts.
John Tunstall attacked this monopoly with the help and encouragement ofAlexander McSween. On 22 March 1877 Tunstall wrote
to his father of his plan to overthrow the Murphy firm and to create
his own "Ring." Gaining army and Indian contracts became his first
priority, but he also eyed the post tradership. "I can't touch the
beef contract yet," he confided. In the meantime Tunstall opened
a store and in July and August, with McSween and the reticent
Chisum as partners, began the Lincoln County Bank. 38 Settlers
applauded Tunstall's competition with Murphy, but it was obvious
that he and McSween acted in their own interest.
Since the agency received beef and flour from Riley who acted
as subcontractor for three firms in Santa Fe, the Tunstall-McSween
strategy involved challenging Dolan and Riley by compromising
the agent. Their attacks on Godfroy displayed a ruthlessness and
singlemindedness that would have done credit to their opposition.
Unfortunately, Godfroy played into their hands. He continued to
fend off raids on the Mescaleros by "Texans" and denounced the
lawlessness of the "white savages."39 Since the "Texans" worked for
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Chisum and retaliated against real or imagined Mescalero depredations, Godfroy took a violent dislike to the cattle baron and his
two associates. This reaction put him automatically, in the eyes of
the other side, in the Dolan-Riley camp. Ironically, Godfroy's career and reputation, unlike those of the previous agents, were about
to be destroyed not by Murphy interests, but by their opposition.
In September 1877 the commissioner, acting on an anonymous
letter, asked Godfroy to explain why he issued more supplies than
usual. Godfroy replied that he lacked storage room, that some of
the Indians departed because of the raids, and that the surplus
beef would spoil. In October another anonymous letter informed
the commissioner that the Indians received bad flour even though
the clerk showed good quality flour to an inspector. Moreover, the
letter charged, Godfroy supplied agency sugar for the Murphy store
at Lincoln. 40
Once the Lincoln County war began, attacks on the agent increased. Just before and after the murder of Tunstall, McSween,
who may have authored the two anonymous letters, wrote a vituperative letter to Carl Schurz, the secretary of the interior, and
to the Reverend John C. Lowrie. McSween stated that Godfroy
was called a "Presbyterian fraud" and that he had been in cahoots
with the Murphy Company for two years. He further accused the
agent of selling Indian supplies through the Murphy store and of
exaggerating the number of Indians who, because of his neglect,
turned to murder and depredation. McSween then recommended
appointment of Robert A. Widenmann, a close friend of Tunstall,
as Indian agent. When the government did not act, Widenmann
filed charges against Godfroy with Secretary Schurz, an intimate
friend of the Widenmann family. Similar reports about the agent
reached the army, intimating that because the Indians had no beef
for several days (the contractor having failed to make delivery) they
would surely go on the warpath. 41
When Col. Nathan Dudley investigated these charges, he found
that the contractor delivered one day later and that the Indians
showed every confidence in their agent. But in May delivery was
again interrupted when McSween-Chisum forces drove off Riley's
cattle to prevent them from reaching the agency. Then Zadoc Staab
and Company of Santa Fe, Riley's contractors, failed to deliver flour
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because of the unsettled conditions. When Godfroy turned to Dudley for supplies, he was told that the army could not interfere in
private matters. Thus in May 1878 the agent and the Indians were
left to their own devices. Most of the Mescaleros fled from the
reservation. Major Murphy also left Lincoln County for Santa Fe,
where in October he died of "general debility. "42
Murphy's departure coincided with the beginning of an official
investigation. McSween's and Widenmann's reports of fraud, and
undoubtedly Widenmann's high connections, caused the Bureau
ofIndian Affairs to send Col. C. E. Watkins to investigate. But the
investigation of the agency was shortly reassigned to Judge Frank
Warner Angel. Godfroy stood accused of lending government property to individuals, of exaggerating the number of Indians, and of
defrauding the government. After Angel heard all witnesses, he
suspected that none told the whole story. The most damaging evidence, and an action that Godfroy eventually acknowledged, involved lending agency supplies to merchants Pat Coglin, Dr. J. H.
Blazer, and, notably, to Dolan and Company. Angel rejected Godfroy's explanation that his clerk, Bernstein, disposed of these supplies without his knowledge. Angel also concluded that Godfroy
had not loaned, but had appropriated "vast quantities of government property." Yet Angel did not condemn the agent completely.
He stated that Godfroy was one of the best agents the Mescaleros
had had; he kept them peaceful, well fed, and his daughter ran a
successful school. Still, Angel recommended Godfroy's suspension,
effective August 1878. 43
Godfroy wrote to the commissioner, inquiring why he had been
suspended. He stated that he merely continued the lending practices of previous agents and accused his clerk of disposing of supplies without his knowledge. He saw John Chisum, a "noted horse
and cattle thief," behind the campaign to remove him. Bernstein
was unfortunately killed in early August and could not tell his story.
Still, some evidence presented to Angel supported Godfroy's defense. 44
Before his death, Bernstein acknowledged that the Murphy
Company had received sugar, coffee, and tobacco from the agency
since May 1876, two months before Godfroy's arrival. He explained
that merchants often loaned and borrowed supplies and even loaned
them to the army commissary. Godfroy had already testified he
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first loaned supplies in August, merely continuing an established
practice. 45
Whether the merchants had returned these goods to the agency
became the crux of the issue. Here evidence split along factional
lines. Dolan stated that the company kept tally on pieces of paper
marked "borrowed" and destroyed them when goods were returned. Needless to say, such a system left no proof of his claim.
Murphy's witnesses claimed that Godfroy received the same or
better quality merchandise, but Tunstall's side countered that no
merchandise was returned and that the Indians received bad flour
and beef. In an instance of the pot calling the kettle black, Dolan
attacked McSween and Chisum for attempting to gain Indian contracts by having the agent removed. 46 The issue thus became more
significant than the age,nt's. guilt or innocence.
An additional piece of evidence unknown to Angel came from
the Indians. One witness recounted that Godfroy had stolen supplies, using Mescalero drivers to haul them to Las Cruces, but the
Mescaleros put an end to that practice by raiding their own supplies. They expressed chagrin that Godfroy was allowed to resign
and not jailed. But the Indians were not unbiased. They and the
Murphy enterprise enjoyed a long, amiable relationship, based on
Murphy's presents, his knowledge of army ways, control of greenhorn agents, and domination of agency affairs. Not surprisingly,
twenty Mescaleros joined James Dolan and soldiers to search for
the remnants of the Tunstall-McSween faction. 47 Apparently the
Indians did not suspect that the Murphy firm participated in trafficking with their supplies.
Ironically, the disrupted economy of Lincoln County became the
death knell for the Murphy business. On the surface, government
contracts seemed to guarantee steady income, but the government
procrastinated or forgot to pay for the supplies. In May 1878 the
Dolan-Riley partnership, which had i~herited the Murphy enterprise, went out of business. The holdings then passed into the
hands of a relative of Thomas B. Catron, the territorial district
attorney. This move confirmed the long-standing suspicion that
Murphy had friends in high places. 48
Godfroy's replacement, James A. Broadhead, beat a hasty retreat
after learning of the trouble in Lincoln County.. The newspapers
ridiculed him, stating that "he had also taken up the foolish idea
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that unless he as agent should allow contractors for supplies at the
agency to cheat and steal from the Indians, they would either kill
him or trump up some charges against him and have him removed. "49 Yet this is an accurate description of the situation at the
agency and the fate of the four agents.
Mostly inexperienced, they arrived in an unfamiliar country,
dominated by an avaricious company and surrounded by uncooperative neighbors: the Mescaleros, settlers, and the military. All
agents repeatedly complained to the Bureau of Indian Affairs and
to the Presbyterian mission board about Murphy's interference in
agency affairs. Still, Curtis, Bushnell, and Crothers were accused
of precisely the things they tried to combat. Only Godfroy faced
charges of corruption, but evidence against him came from witnesses involved in a deadly struggle.
A strikingly similar situation that involved agent John C. Tiffany,
the army, and local politicians cropped up several years later at the
San Carlos agency in Arizona. 50 Tiffany, like the Mescalero agents,
has been condemned by some historians on questionable evidence.
Perhaps a stronger personality such as the indomitable John P.
Clum of San Carlos could have successfully resisted local opposition. If anyone could be proved at fault in New Mexico, however,
it was a national administration that allowed the situation to continue for nearly ten years.

NOTES
1. See, for example, John Bret Harte, ''The Strange Case ofJoseph C. Tiffany:
Indian Agent in Disgrace," Journal of Arizona History 16 (Winter 1975): 383404.
2.. For details on the Lincoln County war and Lincoln County affairs consult
The Life and Death ofJohn Henry Tunstall, the Letters, Diaries, and Adventures
of an Itinerant Englishman, Supplemented with Other Documents and Annotations, ed. and compo Frederick W. Nolan (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico
[UNM] Press, 1965); Maurice Garland Fulton's History of the Lincoln County
War, ed. Robert N. Mullin (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1968); Victor
Westphall, Thoma!) Benton Catron and His Era (Tucson: University of Arizona
Press, 1973); William A. Keleher, Violence in Lincoln County, 1869-1881: A New
Mexico Item (Albuquerque: UNM Press, 1957); Harwood P. Hinton, Jr., "John
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1956): 177-205. For a summary of Mescalero agency affairs between 1871 and
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1878 see C. L. Sonnichsen, The Mescalero Apaches (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1958), pp. 143-48.
3. Confusion exists about when the company came to Lincoln County and its
subsequent status as post traders and Indian traders. Mullin, A Chronology of
the Lincoln County War (Santa Fe: Press of the Territorian, 1966), p. 9, states
that the store was established in 1866 and that the firm was evicted from Fort
Stanton in 1869. Westphall, Catron, p. 76 dates the store from 1866 to 1873. Lee
Scott Theisen, "Frank Warner Angel's Notes on New Mexico Territory, 1878,"
Arizona and the West 18 (Winter 1976): 359, cites Angel's report that the company
was dismissed from Fort Stanton in the early 1870s.
Confusion is compounded by the names of the various successors to the original
firm. The establishment is referred to as Fritz, Murphy & Company; L. G. Murphy
& Company; Murphy, Dolan & Company; and J. J. Dolan & Company. By changing its name and substituting friends and associates in the place of its more
notorious members, the Murphy enterprise managed to remain as post and Indian
traders. For the character of the company members, see Lily Klasner, My Girlhood
A71Wng Outlaws, ed. Eve Ball (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1972), p. 94,
passim. Company transfer dates are also unclear. Dolan states that his company
was founded 1 March 1874 and continued until 1 March 1877. See Dolan's testimony in the report of Frank Warner Angel, Special Agent, "In the Matter of
Examination and Charges against F. C. Godfroy, U. S. Indian Agent, Mescalero
Apaches, New Mexico, October 1878," p. 39, U.S., Department of the Interior,
Bureau of Indian Affairs, Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, New
Mexico Superintendency, (1824-1881), Record Group (RG ) 75, National Archives
(NA) Microfilm Publication M234, roll 573. Nolan, Tunstall, p. 189, states that
Riley (or Reiley) became a partner in November 1876, while Theisen, "Angel's
Notes," cites Angel that Riley joined Murphy and Dolan in 1876 and became a
partner in 1877.
4. Although the Mescaleros had congregated around Fort Stanton since 1869,
the government did not establish a formal reservation until 1873 (U. S., Department of the Interior, Census Office, Report on Indians Taxed and Indians Not
Taxed in the United States (except Alaska), at the Eleventh Census, 1890 [Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1894], p. 398).
5. U.S., Department of the Interior, Interior Department Appointment Papers; Territory of New Mexico, 1850-1907, RG 75, NA M750, roll 12, frames 55254. It seems that all of these men either served in the California militia or fought
under Kit Carson. Murphy's military career is, however, somewhat murky. See
Philip J. Rasch, "The Rise of the House of Murphy," in 1956 Brand Book, Denver
Westerners (Boulder: Johnson Publishing, 1957), p. 57. See also Petition, 6 October 1870, RG 75, NA M750, roll 13, frames 102-4.
6. Murphy to Colonel Robert Campbell, member of the Board of Indian
Commissioners, 4 May 1871, RG 75, NA M750, roll 12, frames 795-96; S. B.
Bushnell to commissioner of Indian affairs, 25 January 1877, RG 75, NA M234,
roll 570; Murphy to commissioner, 23 May 1871, RG 75, NA M234, roll 558.
William Brady, later appointed sheriff by Murphy, served as his henchman during
the Lincoln County war. See Nolan, Tunstall, p. 282, passim. Also consult A. J.
Curtis to John C. Lowrie, 19 September 1870, American Indian Correspondence:
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The Presbyterian Historical Society Collection of Missionaries' Letters, 1833-1893
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press Microfilm Publication, n. d.), roll B-2, frame
185, hereafter cited as PHSC.
7. [U.S., Department of the Interior, Bureau ofIndian Affairs], Report of the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior for the Year 1871
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1872), p. 401. Hereafter cited
as CIA 1871.
8. CIA 1871, p. 403. Nathaniel Pope to commissioner, 13 June 1871, RG 75,
NA M234, rolI 558.
9. Curtis to Pope, 18 June 1872, Murphy to Pope, 17 June 1872, RG 75, NA
M234, roll 559.
10. For details on Smith, see Klasner, Girlhood, pp. 68-69, 113; Mullin, Chronology, p. 10; Nolan, Tunstall, p. 182.
11. Curtis to Ulysses S. Grant, 8 August, 15 November 1872, RG 75, NA M750,
roll 13, frames 88, 95.
12. [U. S., Department of the Interior, Bureau ofIndian Affairs], A nnual Report
of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior for the Year
1873 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1874), p. 263. Hereafter
cited as CIA 1873. Major W. R. Price to Lt. Thomas Blair, 25 November 1873,
RG 75, NA M750, roll 12, frame 510.
13. H. G. Tillman to commissioner, 28 April 1873, RG 75, NA M234, roll 561.
See vouchers of 31 March, 30 April 1873, RG 75, NA M234, rolls 560-61. Bushnell
explained that he had sent his son to eavesdrop on the company (Bushnell to
commissioner, 4 June 1873, RG 75, NA M234, roll 560).
14. Bushnell to Lowrie, 3 April 1873, PHSC, roll M, frame 107.
15. Bushnell to L. E. Dudley, 1 May 1873, Dudley to commissioner, 5 May
1873, RG 75, NA M234, roll 560.
16. Although the firm was not involved in cattle ranching as such, it bought
cheap cattle, kept them on Murphy's Fairview Ranch near Carrizo, and then sold
them to beef contractors (Fulton, Lincoln County War, p. 48). Klasner, Girlhood,
p. 97, states that the ranch was near Carrizozo. Ironically, it seems that John S.
Chisum requested the seizure to satisfy a debt either against Riley, who was at
that time Smith's contractor, or against Smith (Bushnell to Dudley, 8 May 1873,
Dudley to commissioner, 27 May 1873, RG 75, NA M234, roll 560; Dudley to
Staab & Company, 3 October 1874, RG 75, NA M234, roll 563; Klasner, Girlhood,
p. 268).
17. Dudley to Bushnell, 10 May 1873, RG 75, NA M234, roll 560.
18. Bushnell to commissioner, 4 June 1873, RG 75, NA M234, roll 560.
19. Report of Capt. James F. Randlett to Adjutant General, 22 July 1873 and
Capt. C. M. McKibbin to Adjutant General, 24 July 1873, RG 75, NA M234, roll
561. McKibbin defended the firm stating that it did not serve officially as post
trader for two years. If true, this would explain the "removal" of the Murphy firm
in 1870. Nolan states that after the Randlett episode the company was finally
expelled from Fort Stanton and the reservation (30 September 1873) and that the
firm moved to Lincoln (Nolan, Tunstall, pp. 185-87). See also Fulton, Lincoln
County War, p. 47.
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20. Lawrence L. Mehrer, ed., "Scouting for Mescaleros, the Price Campaign
of 1873," Arizona and the West 10 (Summer 1968): 171.
21. Report of Maj. W. R. Price on Affairs at the Mescalero Agency, 13 December
1873, RG 75, NA M750, roll 12, frames 491-510. Price reported that Murphy
arrested his feed supplier, forcing him to withdraw his troops.
22. Bushnell to Lowrie, 27 August 1873, PHSC, roll M, frame 225.
23. CIA 1873, pp. 274-75, 264. Price stated in his report that the company
had someone in Santa Fe and in the War Departn~ent to protect its interests
because for three years the secretary of war had failed to appoint a new post
trader. Five of the new appointees either left or sold out to Murphy. Finally, the
appointment of Paul Dowlin, Murphy's friend, was accomplished. This act raises
the specter of an "Indian Ring," a corrupt compact among the officials of the Indian
Department. Although some have argued the existence of such an organized
conspiracy in New Mexico, the charges have not been proven (Fulton, Lincoln
County War, pp. 51-53).
24. Dudley to commissioner, 26 August, 21 October 1873, Secretary of the
Interior to commissioner, 16 November 1873, RG 75, NA M234, roll 561.
25. Price to Lt. J. P. Willard, 13 December 1873, RG 75, NA M750, roll 12,
frame 524. Price wrote that Bushnell was "too honest."
26. W. D. Crothers to Lowrie, 9 December 1870, PHSC, roll B-2, frame 109.
Crothers came from Valparaiso, Indiana, but was transferred to the Mescalero
agency from Abiquiu.
27. It was long suspected that Murphy provided whiskey from his still to keep
army officers friendly. Some therefore sided with Murphy and his men in their
numerous altercations, while others, like Price and Randlett, found the Murphy
crowd despicable (Klasner, Girlhood, p. 97; Frank D. Reeve, "The Federal Indian
Policy in New Mexico, 1858-1880, IV," NMHR 13 Guly 1938): 272; Crothers to
Post Adjutant, 18 July 1874, Maj. D. R. Clendenin to Crothers [?] 21 July 1874,
RG 75, NA M234, roll 562).
28. Clendenin to Lt. A. G. Hennissee, 12 January 1875, RG 75, NA M234,
roll 564; Clendenin to Acting Assistant Adjutant General, 5, 12 January 1875, RG
75, NA M234, roll 565. Lt. T. C. Devin to Acting Assistant Adjutant General, 15
January 1875, RG 75, NA M234, roll 565. Reeve, "Federal Policy," p. 273; Fulton,
Lincoln County War, p. 273. Murphy's name was, however, stricken off the complaint. See Lincoln County Criminal Docket, Case 99, State Records Center and
Archives, Santa Fe.
29. Reeve, "Federal Policy," p. 272; [U.S., Department of the Interior, Bureau
of Indian Affairs], Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the
Secretary of the Interior for the Year 1875 (Washington, D.C.; Government
Printing Office, 1875), pp. 329, 34-35. Fulton, Lincoln County War, p. 25.
30. Crothers to commissioner, 13 December 1875, RG 75, NA M234, roll 566.
Vouchers of John S. Chisum, 5 February 1876, RG 75, NA M234, roll 567.
31. Reeve, "Federal Policy," p. 273; Fulton, Lincoln County War, p. 27. Resignation of Crothers, 9 February 1876, RG 75, NA M750, roll 13, frame 58.
32. F. C. Godfroy originally came from Michigan (PHSC, roll 0, frames 116,
118). Fulton, Lincoln County War, p. 283, states that the agent was "hand-in-
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glove" with the company; Keleher, Violence, p. 71, quotes the Las Vegas Gazette,
21 September 1878, which states that Godfroy was a "fraud"; Hinton "Chisum,"
p. 193, and Reeve, "Federal Policy," p. 277, find him partly innocent. Sonnichsen,
Mescalero Apaches, p. 147, states that Godfroy "allowed himself to be taken into
camp by Murphy and . . . Dolan."
33. Godfroy to commissioner, 8 July, 21, 22 August 1876, RG 75, NA M234,
roll 566. Godfroy to Lowrie, 19 February 1877, PHSC, roll C, frame 113.
34. Godfroy to commissioner, 5 January 1877; RG 75, NA M234, roll 570.
Although the practice seems irregular, agent Crothers also reported selling 40,000
pounds of beef from a previous contract when the new contractor commenced
delivery (Crothers to commissioner, 16 September 1874, RG 75, NA M234, roll
562).
35. [U. S., Department of the Interior, Bureau ofIndian Affairs], Annual Report
of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior for the Year
1876 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1876), p. 108.
36. [U. S., Department of the Interior, Bureau ofIndian Affairs], Annual Report
of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior for the Year
1877 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1877), p. 157. Hereafter
cited as CIA 1877. Fulton, Lincoln County War, p. 72.
37. M. J. Bernstein to commissioner, 14, 16 February, 17 March 1877, RG 75,
NA M234, roll 570.
38. Nolan, Tunstall, pp. 205-6, 213, 225, 345.
39. CIA 1877, pp. 156-58. Vouchers for Spielberg & Company, 1 November
1876, Rosenthal & Company, 1 December 1876, RG 75, NA M234, roll 569;
Hinton, "Chisum," p. 195. Hinton's contention that "through the agent's patronage
J. J. Dolan & Company came into being and consistently received the local Indian
beefand flour contract for the next few years" is inaccurate. Only the commissioner
of Indian affairs could approve bids on contracts. The contracts were held by
Santa Fe merchant firms of Spielberg, Staab, and Rosenthal, and Dolan acted as
their subcontractor.
40. Godfroy to commissioner, 21 September 1877, RG 75, NA M234, roll 570.
Anonymous to secretary of the interior, 27 October 1877, RG 75, NA M234, roll
570.
41. Tunstall was killed 18 February 1878 (A. A. McSween to commissioner, 11
February 1878, and McSween to Lowrie, 25 February, 1 April 1878, RG 75, NA
M234, roll 571). McSween, however, did not like Widenmann who was described
as an opportunist by other observers (Nolan, Tunstall, p. 182). Clerk Bernstein
testified that in November 1877 Widenmann offered Bernstein interest in the
Indian contracts Tunstall and McSween intended to gain. See testimony of Bernstein in the Report of Frank Warner Angel, p. 123, RG 75, NA M234, roll 573.
42. Col. N. Dudley to Lt. [?] Laud, 11 May 1878, RG 75, NA M234, roll 575.
Godfroy to commissioner, 18 May 1878, RG 75, NA M234 roll 574. Dudley to
Godfroy, 29 May 1878, RG 75, NA M234, roll 573.
43. See introduction to the Report of Frank Warner Angel. Keleher, Violence,
p. 94, states that Murphy died on 19 October 1878; Theisen, "Angel's Notes," p.
354, places the death on 30 October 1878.
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44. Codfroy to commissioner, 21 November 1878, RC 75, NA M234, roll 576,
and RC 75, NA M750, roll 13, frame 182.
45. Report of Frank Warner Angel, testimony of Codfroy, pp. 128, 99.
46. For pro-Murphy testimony, see Codfroy, Riley, Peppin, and Evans; for proMcSween commentary, consult the depositions of Stanley, Widenmann, Carter
and Farmer in Report of Frank Warner Angel.
47. Eve Ball, In the Days of Victoria (Tucson: University of Arizona Press,
1970), pp. 34, 44. However, the witness was a young Warm Springs Apache, not
a Mescalero. See also Frederick W. Nolan, "A Sidelight on the Tunstall Murder,"
NMHR 31 Guly 1956): 206-22.
48. Thus in 1873 the Staab Company demanded a payment from the government of nearly $13,000 for vouchers from Emil Fritz. In July 1874 the comptroller
rejected Fritz's and Dolan's claim from October 1872 for more than $3,000. The
Second National Bank of Santa Fe repeatedly requested a payment of some $8,000
on Riley's vouchers. A year later the bank forwarded a petition to the commissioner,
signed, among others, by Spielberg and Company, Van C. Smith, Riley, and
Murphy for payments due them. See the following vouchers: Staab and Company
to commissioner, 8 November 1873, RC 75, NA M234, roll 561; Acting Auditor
C. E. Henning [?] to commissioner, 21 July 1874, RC 75, NA M234, roll 562;
Second National Bank of Santa Fe to commissioner, 11 November 1876, RC 75,
NA M234, roll 569; Spielberg and Company to the Secretary of the Interior, 30
October 1877, RC 74, NA M235, roll 572. Rasch, "House of Murphy," p. 80.
Westphal!, Catron, pp, 81, 127.
49. James A. Broadhead was appointed 10 September 1878 and resigned when
he arrived in New Mexico, 1 November 1878 (RC 75, NA M750, roll 12, frame
125). Santa Fe Rocky Mountain Sentinel, 1 November 1878.
50. Harte, "Tiffany," passim.

NEWS NOTES
Professor Daniel Tyler would be grateful for information regarding the whereabouts or content of private collections of documents
dealing with the Mexican period in New Mexico (1821-1848). He
is preparing a guide for research on this period and has identified
most public repositories in the United States and Mexico. Suggestions should be sent to him in care of the Department of History,
Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colo., 80523.
"Women Artists and Writers of the Southwest," edited by Marta
Field and Vera Norwood, is available as Volume 4, .number 3 of
New America, a journal of American and southwestern culture.
Funding for this project was made possible through a grant from
the National Endowment for the Arts. Copies may be obtained
from New America, %American Studies Dept., University of New
Mexico, Albuquerque, 87131, for $4.00.
The Raton Friends ofAnthropology have made available reprints
of George Wheeler's 1877 map of the Raton area. Orders may be
directed to Nancy Robertson, Box 10, Raton, N. Mex., 87740. The
maps are $3.00, or $5.00 rolled, postpaid.
The Center for Anthropological Studies in Albuquerque has recently published Spanish Colonial Frontier Research, compiled
and edited by Henry F. Dobyns. The first in a series entitled
Spanish Borderlands Research, the volume contains nine articles
about the archaeology, ethnohistory and history of the Spanish
Borderlands. The book is available from the Center for Anthropological Studies, P.O. Box 14576, Albuquerque, 87191. The price
is $14.00, plus $1.50 for postage.
The EI Paso Centennial Museum has available soft-cover copies
of Riders of the Borderlands, containing the artwork of Jose Cisneros. Twenty-one of the artist's works appear along with a brief
sketch, "Cisneros: The Man and His Art," by John O. West. To
order, send $2.00 plus 65¢ postage to EI Paso Centennial Museum,
University of Texas at EI Paso, EI Paso, Tex., 79968.

"TIRED OF WAITING":
SENATOR ALBERT B. FALL'S ALTERNATIVE
TO WOODROW WILSON'S MEXICAN POLICIES,

1920-1921

CLIFFORD W. TROW

ON 10 AUGUST 1919, the Mexican newspaper El Universal asked
a crucial question of a recently appointed Senate subcommittee to
investigate Mexican affairs. Did the subcommittee members favor
"armed intervention" as the best means of protecting foreign interests in Mexico? Reminding Chairman Albert B. Fall of New
Mexico that El Universal had been unique among Mexican dailies
in supporting the Allies during World War I, the newspaper asserted that because of the differences in strength between Mexico
and the United States, armed intervention would constitute an
invasion similar to that of Belgium by the Germans.!
After conferring with the full Committee on Foreign Relations,
Senator Fall responded to El Universal. Neither he as chairman of
the subcommittee nor his colleagues Frank B. Brandegee of Connecticut and Mark Smith of Arizona would reply individually. Instead, Fall asserted, the subcommittee would discharge its duties
"without fear, favor, or prejudice" and would be "guided by the
facts and circumstances as developed through an investigation,"
which would be "most thorough and exhaustive."2
Eight months later, as he was preparing his official report to the
Senate with recommendations for a change in United States policy
toward Mexico, Fall confided in his wife: "It is now agreed that
the overthrow of Carranza was brought about by the activities of
this committee. . . ." Emphasizing that his response to El Universal's question about intervention had been interpreted in Mexico
0028-6206/82/0400-0159 $2.40/0
© Regents, University of New Mexico
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by most of the political factions as meaning that Venustiano Carranza must "get out," Fall noted that the action of his subcommittee
had broken the nerve of Carranza's followers. The Mexicans understood, Fall stressed, that the Congress was "tired of waiting" and
intended to act.
Although he may have overstated the effects of his subcommittee's investigation in precipitating the overthrow of Carranza, Fall
correctly assessed the sentiment of the dominant majority of the
sixty-second Congress. They were so opposed to the "watchful
waiting" approach of President Woodrow Wilson that they intended
to stay in session until December to check the president's Mexican
policies. 3 Many of the members of the Republican-controlled Congress viewed the president's restraint as weakness and his reliance
upon diplomacy rather than military force in Mexico to secure the
protection of American lives and property as a weak and vacillating
approach that prolonged turmoil' in the southern republic. 4
By August 1919, when the Senate authorized the Fall subcommittee's investigation of Mexican affairs, many of Fall's colleagues
from both parties had become convinced that the United States
should straighten out Mexico by anned intervention. Senator Henry
Cabot Lodge, Republican from Massachusetts, was such an "interventionist." Since 1914 Lodge had voiced his criticism of the
Wilson administration's Mexican policies. When the new Congress
convened in 1919, Lodge had been chosen by his Republican colleagues to be chairman of the influential Committee on Foreign
Relations. It was Lodge who had appointed Fall to be chairman of
the subcommittee investigating Mexican affairs. After the subcommittee had issued its "interim" report in December 1919, Lodge
wrote to friends that the aim of the Fall subcommittee was to work
for a "proper" solution to the Mexican problem, one that would
make the "Cuban arrangement" with Mexico. On 22 December
1919, Lodge told Maj. Gen. James H. Wilson that he could not
see any escape from intervention and the erection of a government
in Mexico that the United States could sustain. S
From the beginning of its investigation in September 1919 until
May 1920, the Fall subcommittee worked closely with a large group
of vested interests that had already organized a publicity campaign
to swing public opinion behind a harsh policy toward Mexico. In

TROW: FALL'S ALTERNATIVE

161

fact, the relationship was so close that it is impossible to separate
the activities of the subcommittee from what was, in fact, an organized movement to force the Wilson administration to intervene
in Mexico. Aided by a coalition of interests including the Association
of Oil Producers in Mexico, the National Association for the Protection of American Rights in Mexico (NAPARIM), and a number
of smaller investors represented in the membership of the Murray
Hill group, the Fall subcommittee prepared a sensational case against
the Mexican government of Venustiano Carranza. 6
Early in December 1919, Fall in effect tipped his hand, revealing
his interventionist trumps. During the crisis with Mexico over the
kidnapping of Consular Agent William O. Jenkins, Fall issued a
special report on behalf ofhis subcommittee in which he announced
that the Carranza government was spreading Bolshevik propaganda
in the United States. Fall then introduced a concurrent resolution
that upheld the State Department in making peremptory demands
for the release of Jenkins. The resolution also called for the severance of diplomatic relations with Mexico.
As newspapers headlined the imminence of war with Mexico,
President Wilson responded from his sick bed in disapproval of the
Fall resolution. That disapproval and the release ofJenkins prompted
the Foreign Relations Committee to let the resolution die, much
to the annoyance of Fall and Lodge. As his subcommittee travelled
to the Southwest early in 1920, Fall directed his attack not only at
the Carranza regime, but also toward President Wilson, who was
made to appear responsible for the Mexican situation. 7
In May 1920, however, the Mexican situation suddenly changed
as a coup d'etat replaced the Carranza government with a new
provisional government under Adolfo de la Huerta. Gen. Alvaro
Obregon, a participant in the coup, was generally regarded to be
the certain victor in the Mexican election scheduled for September
of that year. Huerta and Obregon tried to ease the tension by
promising that the new Mexican government would protect American lives and property. The Mexican leaders also tried to reassure
the big American oil companies that their property would not be
expropriated, that Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917
would not be interpreted retroactively.8 Officials of the Association
of Oil Producers in Mexico and NAPARIM were encouraged by
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these pledges. Almost immediately NAPARIM began to consider
the possibility of sending a large delegation to Mexico to discuss
outstanding differences with the Mexican government. 9
Fall opposed the project. Reflecting the viewpoint of the independent oil operators and of the smaller investors, Fall told Harold
Walker, attorney for Edward L. Doheny, who was one of the largest
American oil producers in Mexico, that it would be a mistake for
the large companies to make special arrangements with the new
Mexican government. He argued that the big companies had been
able to keep operating, but 15,000 small American farmers had
been driven out of Mexico. The issue should not be confused by
Americans independently treating with the Mexican government,
he said. Referring to the work of his committee and its forthcoming
recommendations, Fall emphasized that the whole Mexican issue
should be settled at once and settled right. With a rare optimism,
Fall asserted that at last they were in a position to settle it right. 10
In a letter to Doheny describing the long conversation, Walker
indicated that Fall had been in close contact with Secretary of State
Bainbridge Colby and that they were agreed that nothing in the
way of recognition should be given to the new Mexican government
until that government had shown by its actions that it would treat
all Americans justly. Walker added that Fall was considering putting
into his committee report "an idea of negotiating a treaty" but no
treaty would be ratified by the Senate that failed to clear up all
the points for all Americans and guaranteed their safety and respect
for their interests. The United States government, Fall told Walker,
is "our protector." Walker found Fall confident that either a satisfactory settlement would be made or an intervention would occur.
Noting that Fall was bending all his efforts to the Mexican matter,
Walker advised Doheny that Fall has been "our best friend and
our best bet and I believe that his advice should be given great
consideration." 11
Undoubtedly because they believed that Fall spoke for the Republican-controlled Congress and that he had correctly reflected
the sentiment within the State Department, the Association of Oil
Producers in Mexico and its subSidiary propaganda organization,
NAPARIM, decided to follow Fall's advice.
Fall submitted his lengthy report with the testimonies of 257
witnesses and with his recommendations to the United States Sen-
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ate on 20 May 1920,12 The recommendations called for a prolonged
period of nonrecognition for the new government in Mexico while
it demonstrated its ability to protect American lives and property,
During the period of nonrecognition the United States would hold
not only the Mexican government but all of the Mexican factions
strictly accountable for any outrage or injustice to American life
and property in Mexico. 13
After a period of stabilizing itself and of displaying its willingness
to uphold the rules of international law, the new Mexican government could secure recognition by agreeing in a formal treaty to
change sections of the Constitution of 1917, especially by providing
exemptions for Americans from the constitution's most revolutionary provisions, i. e" from Articles 3, 27, 33, and 130.J4 In addition,
Mexico would have to agree to participate with the United States
in constituting joint commissions to settle boundary and claims
disputes. 15 Should Mexico be unwilling to make such treaty agreements,Fall recommended that the United States should react vigorously by again warning the Mexican government that it must
protect American life and by taking military action when the Mexican government failed to provide protection.
Reaction to the proposals of the Fall subcommittee was mixed,
Mexicans of all factions were alarmed at what the recommendations,
if implemented, would do to Mexican sovereignty. Certain segments of the American press and the more liberal community condemned the Fall approach as extreme. From the "hands up, your
money or your life" description in the New Republic to the milder
view of the New York Times that the new government deserved a
chance to put its house in order before being met with such stringent demands, the press generally agreed with the New Republic
as it admonished the Mexican government to put an end to the
epoch of revolution if intervention were to be forestalled. 17
By spring of 1920, Fall had the requisite position and support
to exert a powerful influence over Mexican affairs. No senator spoke
in opposition to the Fall report and recommendations when they
were submitted through the Committee on Foreign Relations to
the Senate for acceptance. 18 JOined by a solid majority party contingent headed by Lodge, the hard line senators, including many
Democrats, were a powerful force in that house, while the sentiment in the lower house was probably of a similar tone. 19

Albert B. Fall. Courtesy of UNM Special Collections Department.
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Although he did not attend the June convention, Fall was most
influential in determining the plank on Mexico in the Republican
Party's platform. He prepared the plank to conform to the recommendations of his subcommittee. Not only did that convention
accept Fall's recommendations, but it also strengthened Fall's influence by nominating his good friend and colleague on the Committe on Foreign Relations, Warren G. Harding, as the Republican
candidate for president. 20
Mexico was only one of a number of important issues that divided
the candidates during the campaign of 1920. Fall advised Harding
on Mexican matters, and his influence was evident as the Ohio
senator condemned the Mexican policies of Woodrow Wilson as
weak and vacillating. Democratic candidate Governor James Cox
of Ohio took an opposite view. He opposed intervention by asserting that he would not send American troops into a "hornet's
nest" in order to enhance the interests of American property owners, especially those who had invested in oillands,2l
While the campaign proceeded toward a November victory for
the Republicans, the Wilson administration and Senator Fall gave
a great deal of attention to new developments in Mexico. Huerta's
provisional government made a concerted effort to gain recognition
and to secure financial aid from the United States.
Fall carefully watched Mexican developments. At last he was in
a position for his program to predominate. There were dangers,
however. He had no confidence in Woodrow Wilson, even though
he believed that the State Department approved his approach of
nonrecognition. In addition, the disparate interests that he had
assembled in his "interventionist" coalition were no longer in agreement as to what the best approach might be in dealing with the
new Mexican government. 22 At the moment when Fall's optimism
was the highest, some of these interests hoped to make separate
arrangements with the Mexican government.
Fall's concern was compounded when Fernando Iglesias Calder6n, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, arrived at the
State Department late in June. In the unofficial interviews that
followed, Iglesias Calder6n assured Under-Secretary of State Norman Davis that all responsible parties in his country desired peace
with the United States and that a policy of friendship was necessary
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for the salvation of Mexico. The Mexican ambassador added that
Mexico would make reparation for damages done to Americans in
Mexico and would provide them with protection. 23 After receiving
instructions from President Wilson that the Mexican situation "was
too full ofdoubts" for immediate consideration ofrecognition, Davis
indicated to Iglesias Calderon that the United States was desirous
of encouraging peaceful developments but that recognition would
occur when it was opportune. 24
While Iglesias Calderon was being received unofficially at the
department, Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby conferred with
former Secretary of Interior Franklin Lane and his new employer,
E. L. Doheny. According to Lane, the secretary of state hypnotized
Doheny into thinking that he could perform miracles. Shortly
thereafter Lane sent Colby a ten-page outline of a suggested treaty
with Mexico. The friendly reception given to representatives of the
Association of Oil Producers in Mexico led them to believe Fall's
assertion that the State Department was supportive of his recommendations. 25
In the meantime, Fall responded to a request of Iglesias Calderon that they confer on Mexico. The conference was polite but
to the point. Fall insisted that the recommendations of his subcommittee would be implemented as policy. Shocked to find that Fall
had not moderated his position since the overthrow of Carranza,
the Mexican asserted that his country would not humiliate itself
by accepting a treaty based upon the Fall recommendations.
Fall replied that his recommendations were those of the United
States government since the State Department had indicated its
agreement. Iglesias Calderon refused to believe Fall. He asserted
that Under-Secretary Davis had told him that the United States
would never demand conditions that would give Americans a privileged position in Mexico. 26
Fall realized that the ruling factions in Mexico had not been
convinced that his program would prevail. He sought to dispel
illusions. Through his friend Myron Parker, the senator communicated directly with President-elect Obregon. Parker told Obregon that there would be no recognition until Mexico agreed to
settle points in dispute. "So far as the Department of State is
concerned," Parker said, "I can assure you, General, with full
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knowledge and all truthfulness that before any treaty is entered
into, a satisfactory arrangement must be entered into, and that
agreement recorded in black and white. "27
Mexico's quest for official recognition did not end with Fall's
statements to Iglesias Calderon and Obregon. More determined
than ever, Huerta attempted to secure the support of President
Wilson by recruiting George Creel, former wartime head of the
Committee on Public Information to act for Mexico in dealing with
the administration. In September Creel obtained an interview with
his friend, Woodrow Wilson. 28 He told the president of his many
conversations with representatives of the Mexican government and
especially about their new attitude, which seemed quite reasonable, Creel then asked for permission to go to Mexico for Wilson,
but unofficially and at his own expense, to convey his sentiments
to the Mexican leader concerning an acceptable settlement prior
to recognition. "We had the fullest understanding of the settlement
desired," Creel wrote, What Wilson insisted upon, "and all that he
did insist upon," were: first, Mexico's recognition ofher obligations
under international law with respect to the protection of life and
property and with respect to the ascertainment and payment of
just claims; and second, that Article 27 of the new constitution
should not be given retroactive effect in the sense of confiscating
duly acquired property rights,29
With Wilson's encouragement and Colby's assent, Creel journeyed to Mexico City early in October. He conferred with General
Obregon, Minister of War Plutarco Elias Calles, and Provisional
President Huerta. At every point he found agreement. When he
returned to Washington in mid-October, he was accompanied by
his friend Roberto V. Pesqueira, who was empowered to enter into
formal understandings that would precede recognition. 30
Although at home in New Mexico, Senator Fall stayed alert to
these new developments. On 19 October, Fall's secretary, Charles
Safford, wired from Washington that Creel and Pesqueira were on
their way from Mexico to make a special appeal to President Wilson
for immediate recognition of the Mexican government. 31 Informed
that the State Department was preparing two memoranda for the
president's consideration in opposition to the special plea, Senator
Fall sought to aid what Creel later described as "a spirit of mys-
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terious opposition in the State Department." Fall immediately wired
his office that he had learned from a Justice Department agent that
Creel was employed by the Mexican government as a publicity
agent arid that his specific task was to obtain recognition. 32 After
consultations with Harold Walker of the Doheny interests and with
others in the coalition of interests backing the Fall program, Fall's
secretary decided that it would be advantageous to send Secretary
Colby a copy of Fall's telegram. 33
Despite opposition in the State Department and a direct attack
by the oil men, Creel's mission seemed assured of success when
President Wilson expressed himself as satisfied with the results of
Creel's conversations. In discussions with the president and with
Secretaries Davis and Colby, Creel argued that recognition would
be a vindication of the administration's Mexican policies, that Mexico would be able to build strongly before 4 March, and that the
interventionist attitude of Harding "will be shown to the people
in all of its shamelessness. "34
To facilitate the process and to meet the State Department's
prescription, Creel drew up a protocol in which Mexico agreed to
constitute a claims commission, to create an arbitration board to
decide border questions, and to refrain from applying the provins of Article 27 retroactively. Creel presented the protocol to
Pesqueira with the explanation that when he signed, it bound his
country absolutely. With full knowledge of the consequences, Pesqueira agreed to the terms of the protocol. Creel relayed news of
the agreement to Colby. The secretary's hearty approval led Creel
to believe that the whole matter was ready to go to the president. 35
On 29 October Colby announced to the press that he had received a letter from Pesqueira containing assurances of a friendly
settlement of all points in dispute between the two nations. By
letter Colby responded that Pesqueira's assurances afforded a basis
upon which "the preliminaries of recognition could confidently
proceed."36 As the nation's press resounded with predictions that
Huerta's provisional government would be recognized immediately, Fall's friends moved into action.
Myron Parker visited the State Department the next day to ask
if the department had not changed its attitude from requiring some
arrangement in "black and white." Parker wrote Fall that depart-
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ment members had denied this and had called his attention to the
last line of the secretary's letter in which, "reading between lines,
it will be seen that a promise in writing will have to be made. "37
Election day, 2 November 1920, with its Republican triumph,
came and went without the administration's recognition of the Mexican provisional government. Three days later, however, Charles
Safford telegraphed Fall that the president was expected to extend
recognition in a general statement in which he would declare that
both countries had agreed to settle points in dispute by arbitration.
Safford recommended that Fall get President-elect Harding to make
a public statement that he favored the Fall program rather than
immediate recognition. Safford also noted that efforts were being
made to require that the understanding be made in specific terms
along the lines of the Fall recommendations. 38
The efforts to which Safford referred were described by the
Washington Times as the "monkey wrench in the wheels," thrown
by the Association of Oil Producers in Mexico. 39 Shortly after Colby
had indicated that recognition might soon be granted, attorneys
for the association requested a hearing at the State Department to
present their views on the Mexican settlement. Judge Charles C.
Parker, heading the group, convinced department officials that the
oil company lawyers should help him draft a memorandum containing their views of what an agreement with Mexico should contain. "We had your report before us all the time," Walker later
wrote to Fall, "and we tried to get into the letter everything you
recommended." Walker added that Colby had promised no recognition would be granted until after 1 January 1921. 40
Colby handed Creel a tentative draft of the Parker memorandum
on 5 November. It was an insult to Mexico, Creel declared in
shocked tones to Colby. Colby replied that the State Department
did not agree with all the conditions stated in the memorandum.
More important, however, Colby said that he had doubts about
the sincerity of the Mexican government in the Pesqueira negotiations. From Colby's attitude, Creel discerned that the negotiations would end in failure and that his own motives were suspect. 41
Creel explored the matter with Colby and discovered that the
State Department had heard rumors that he was in the employ of
either the Mexican government or of the oil companies. Creel
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denied the rumors. Although the secretary said that he put little
stock in such charges, Colby refused to give Creel any assurances
about the future of the Pesqueira negotiations. Creel thought that
he had been subjected to a "guerilla attack" within the department,
and he was angry at Colby's attitude. 42
For two weeks the State Department made no visible effort to
further the Pesqueira negotiations. Creel had expected that the
negotiations would result in an exchange of informal notes between
the two governments prior to the announcement of recognition.
No such process occurred. On 10 November, Provisional President
Huerta gave up on the Pesqueira mission. The Mexican leader
announced that Pesqueira did not have authorization to sign anything for the Mexican government. Creel thought that Huerta had
made his announcement because he was irritated at Colby's delay
and had become suspicious about the strairied silence of the administration. Having already obtained Pesqueira's assent to a protocol,
Creel made a last effort to bring the negotiations to a successful
conclusion. He appealed over Colby's head to President Wilson. 43
Creel wrote a "heated" letter to Colby and sent a copy of it to
Mrs. Wilson for the president to read. Creel recounted his involvement in the Pesqueira negotiations, and he reiterated that he
had gone to Mexico at his expense and with the approval of Wilson
and Colby. "I had made myself responsible for the institution of
an orderly process that the State Department had publicly approved," Creel asserted. Why had that process been interrupted?
Why had enthusiasm died so suddenly? And why had he been
subjected to a "guerilla attack"? Creel asked these questions just
before he commented on the impossibility of Mexico accepting the
Parker memorandum. Significantly, he added the following:
I know, just as you know, that there are selfish interests in the
United States-rich, powerful, and unscrupulous-who do not want
the Mexican question settled. They want a continuance of bitterness
until the day when political conditions are ripe for armed intervention which will guarantee their dividends with American bayonets.
They are telling you that it is best to let matters rest until Obregon's
inauguration, December 1, but when Obregon is President they
will have other reasons to urge further delay. 44
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Creel's letter stirred the president and the secretary of state to
respond by letter and to meet with Creel at the White House.
President Wilson backed Colby and Under-Secretary Davis in their
contention that the Mexican government was acting in "ill faith"
and that the only way to deal with Mexico' was through "hard and
fast and formal" agreements. 45
On 25 November Colby brought the Pesqueira negotiations to
a close. After remarking that the conversations about recognition
had been pleasant, Colby suggested to Pesqueira that "as our fruitful discussions draw to a close that commissioners be promptly
designated by both Mexico and the United States to formulate a
treaty, embodying the agreements, which have been reached as
the result of your successful mission. "46 Creel was embittered over
the failure of the Pesqueira mission. He later wrote Henry Morgenthau that Colby's letter had ended the matter. Creel added:
"Why should the Mexican people bother with a treaty which would
have to go to the Republican Senate?"47
Although the oil interests and Senator Fall thought that Secretary
Colby was supportive of the Fall program for recognition of Mexico,
the president and his secretary of state reluctantly backed away
from the Pesqueira negotiations. Wilson and Colby agreed with
Creel that there were "selfish interests" that wanted to dictat~
Mexican policies to their advantage. A good example of Wilson's
prescience in the matter was the warning he gave to Under-Secretary Davis that "men like Doheny and others who are deeply
invqlved in the oil intrigues" were suspect. "We cannot be too
careful not to serve these predatory interests," Wilson emphasized,
"because they intend the demoralization of our own politics and
the control of Mexican politics. "48
Wilson was not alone in this belief. Colby had written the president on 6 November that Doheny representatives had swarmed
into the State Department in opposition to the Pesqueira mission.
The secretary asserted that the Oil Producers Association was endeavoring to retain former Attorney General Thomas Watt Gregory
for the purpose of conferring with Wilson and that other men "who
have been conspicuous in your [Wilson's] administration are said
to be under retainer, and the number of persons whom I have
reason to suspect of being employed to keep us under observation,

172

NEW MEXICO HISTORiCAL REViEW

57:2

1982

is almost too numerous for me to enumerate here." Colby advised
the president that the dominant group of oil men wanted to keep
the Mexican situation static until they could try their hand with
the new administration. "Their purpose seems to be to dangle
recognition and financial support in one hand, and with the other
threaten intervention," Colby concluded. 49
The administration turned away from the Pesqueira negotiations,
not because, as Creel suspected and Fall's coalition believed, the
State Department supported Fall's program, but because Wilson
and Colby believed that the negotiations were premature. The
Mexican government would be unable to keep its commitments,
thus building a new case for intervention. The instability of the
Mexican government was apparent, even at the time that negotiations seemed so favorable. On the one hand oil men told Colby
that General Obregon did not want the provisional government
recognized because he feared that Huerta would set aside the
results of the September election and continue himself in power.
On the other hand, Colby heard that the oil men wanted to postpone recognition until Obregon took office because they intended
to make "a Diaz of Obregon."so
Because of the instability of the Mexican government evidenced
in the rumors that he had heard, and because of additional rumors
that Fall and Harding were about to meet in Texas to discuss the
Mexican problem, Secretary Colby decided that the wisest course
for the administration was to "mark time."51 During the interim,
while the administration was marking time, the power and influence of Senator Fall was at its peak. Already his party controlled
Congress, and Fall looked forward to Republican domination of the
entire federal government within a few months.
Because they, too, were politically cognizant, the Mexican leaders sought to cultivate the next administration. While the Pesqueira
mission was awaiting state department initiatives immediately following the November election, Mexico's Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Cutberto Hidalgo, sent a confidential agent to the United States
to confer with Fall and Harding and to invite them to attend the
inauguration of Obregon in early December. 52
Although assured by a friend that General Obregon was enthusiastic about the project, Senator Fall hesitated. 53 He did not want
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to lessen the impact of his Mexican program by appearing to be
friendly to the new regime. After conferring with the Mexican
agent, however, Fall announced the invitation in a press release,
and he arranged for the agent to confer with Harding. 54 Fall's press
release had the effect of complicating Pesqueira's relations with the
State Department. 55 When the Pesqueira mission responded by
producing a telegram from Obregon denying that anyone was
authorized to act for him, Fall had made his point. The "skittish"
character of the Mexican government had been clearly demonstrated. 56 It was further demonstrated later when Harding designated Fall to be his representative to the inauguration, only to have
a Mexican consul on Pesqueira's orders refuse to vise Fall's passportY
Fall was not overly disappointed at the results of his dealings
with the new Mexican government. The publicity given to Pesqueira's meddling had hurt his mission to the United States. Shortly
after he had ordered Fall stopped at the border, Pesqueira received
Colby's letter that effectively ended his negotiations. 58 Fall had not
been enthusiastic about the trip from the first. He agreed with
Walker who wrote that the senator's trip to Mexico might result in
lessening his influence because "Albert Fall at a distance is a more
austere influence than Fall close at hand and affable." Walker told
Fall that Doheny had also received an invitation to the inauguration, but the petroleum association had advised him not to go
because his attendance might "look like capitulation and result in
stiffening Mexico in defiance of your report. "59
Although he was no longer fearful that the Wilson administration
would counter the effects of his recommendations, Fall sought to
guarantee that the incoming Harding regime would implement his
program. His actiqns were twofold: first, he sought to shore up the
coalition of interests that had in the past supported his program
for Mexico; and second, he worked to gain commitments that his
program would be followed from those who would influence foreign
policy.
With the apparent return of law and order in Mexico under a
government that proclaimed its friendship for the United States
and promised to protect American lives and property, many Americans who had been enthusiastic backers ofan interventionist policy
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now became convinced that a speedy recognition of the new government in Mexico would be to their advantage. This was especially
true of the so-called "border jobbers." These Americans who lived
along the Mexican border and who engaged in business activities
with Mexicans had begun to clamor for recognition. Walker wrote
to Fall to assure him that NAPARIM would counteract their activity
by sending a paid propagandist to the border. Walker added that
NAPARIM's instructions to its agent Chester Crowell, a former
editor of eight newspapers in the Southwest, were for him to interview his editor friends and "to put them straight" by emphasizing
that good business conditions were merely temporary and that the
Mexican constitution of 1917 had been inspired by men of Communistic belief. 60
NAPARIM and Fall were partially effective in blunting the demands of the border jobbers for recognition. Fall's coalition was
also concerned that Mexico's new government might secure financial support in the United States from powerful banking interests.
In December, Fall and representatives of the large oil companies
succeeded in convincing two large banking concerns that it would
be a mistake to lend money to the Huerta government. 61
Greater than his concern over activities of the "border jobbers"
or even over the intentions of the large banking houses was Fall's
fear that the oil companies might desert his program to secure their
interests by separate dealings with the Mexican government. Alvaro Obregon compounded that fear when, in February 1921, he
asserted that the demands of the Republican party in the United
States on Mexico were "more extensive" than those that would
satisfY the oil companies. Not only were the oil companies "anxious
to come to an understanding with the new administration in Mexico," Obregon asserted, but also if a basis for agreement could be
arrived at, "they would use whatever influence they possess to
have such an agreement accepted as a complete settlement. "62
If Fall was angry, and he was, other American investors in his
coalition were furious at this clear indication that the large oil
companies might be willing to settle separately with Mexico. Independent operator William F. Buckley was especially disturbed.
Convinced that the large oil companies would desert the independent and smaller investors in Mexico to further their own in-
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terests, Buckley and Paul Hudson of the Murray Hill group broke
with NAPARIM to organize the American Association of Mexico,
which was wedded to the Fall subcommittee's recommendations.
Buckley later accused the oil companies of "playing with the hare
and running with the hounds" as they were privately urging Washington not to recognize Obregon, while their agents in Mexico
had led the Mexican government to infer that the oil companies
were advocating recognition. 63
Although Doheny tried to reassure Fall of his continued support,
the senator was not certain that Doheny could speak for all of the
oil companies represented in NAPARIM.64 Earlier in January, after
a conference with NAPARIM officials, Fall had sent a firm letter
to that organization for general circulation among its membership.
"So long as I have anything to do with the Mexican question," Fall
had stressed, "no government will be recognized, with my consent,
which government does not first enter into a written agreement. . . ." Fall added that he would oppose all private and separate attempts by individual groups to negotiate settlements. 65
Partially convinced by the fact that Fall had been selected to be
a key member of Harding's original cabinet, the Association of Oil
Producers in Mexico and NAPARIM publicly reaffirmed their support of the Fall program in early March 1921. 66
With his coalition of support somewhat fragmented but nonetheless again firmed up, Senator Fall turned his attention to convincing the new administration of which he was a part that his
program for Mexico should be implemented. As early as January
when the new Congress convened, Henry Lane Wilson, a partisan
supporter of the Fall program, began to interview senators and
almost everyone else identified with the incoming Harding administration. According to William F. Buckley, the consensus of those
interviewed was in harmony with the Fall program. 67
In February the New York Times commented editorially on what
it described as an "inspired Washington dispatch" in the Boston
Transcript. According to the dispatch, Senator Fall was not only
destined to be President Harding's secretary of interior, but he was
also going to be the new president's prompter on Mexican policies.
Noting that Fall's program for Mexico contained stringent conditions including constitutional changes and was accompanied by the
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threat of military intervention, the Times concluded: "If Fall is
installed as Harding's adviser, compromise will be more difficult. "68
Fall was confident that his good friend Harding and he saw eye
to eye on Mexican matters. 69 Although he favored Elihu Root first
as secretary of state, Fall was not dissatisfied with Harding's appointment of Charles Evans Hughes for that position, and he was
quite pleased at the choice of Wilson's former ambassador to Mexico
Henry P. Fletcher to be under-secretary. Fall had advised Hughes
about Mexico during the presidential campaign of 1916. On the
basis of that association Fall believed that Hughes would be favorable to a vigorous policy of protection of American interests in
Mexico. 70
Although he probably had no commitment from Hughes, Senator
Fall considered that Fletcher had endorsed his subcommittee's
recommendations. The former ambassador had publicly and privately advised Secretary of State Colby to postpone recognition of
Mexico until a treaty could be negotiated that would settle outstanding differences between the two countries. Fall was not displeased at newspaper speculation that he and Fletcher would be
the experts who would call the shots in the new administration's
Mexican policies. 71
The day before he left the Senate to join Harding's cabinet, Fall
drafted the final report of his subcommittee in the form of a letter
to Chairman Lodge of the Committee on Foreign Relations. In the
report Fall recounted the major occurrences in Mexican affairs since
the end of May 1920 when his subcommittee had submitted the
findings and recommendations resulting from its investigations.
Despite the changed circumstances in Mexico, Fall reiterated the
recommendations of the subcommittee, and he called, for their
implementation. 72
So Fall seemed to have gotten his way on Mexico. Early in 1921
Fall told Thomas Lamont of the J. P. Morgan Company that in the
last six months, the Mexican policies of the Wilson administration
had been 100 percent good. 73 After nearly eight years of attempting
to influence Wilson's "watchful waiting" policies, Fall had been able
to do so by getting the Republican-dominated Congress to act. And
his program had predominated. Or so it seemed! Of course, Mexico
had not signed in black and white. And there could be no use of
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military force to make her sign anything, so long as Wilson was
president. But Wilson's administration was ending! Fall was confident that Harding, Hughes, and Fletcher would soon be following
his program, Mexico would submit to a treaty that would end its
revolution, or the United States would intervene militarily. 74
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Anderson Diary, Charles P. Anderson Papers, Manuscripts Division, LC. See also
Betty Glad, Charles Evans Hughes and the Illusions of Innocence: A Study in
American Diplomacy (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966), p. 139; and
Robert K. Murray, The Harding Era: Warren G. Harding and His Administration
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"NATURE'S NAT/ON," ENLARGED AND PEN/TENT:
A REV/EW ESSAY

LEWIS O. SAUM

WITNESSES TO AVANISHING AMERICA: THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY RESPONSE. By
Lee Clark Mitchell. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981. Pp. xvii, 320.
Illus., notes, bibliog., index. $18.50.
AN ALMOST IMPERTINENT LINE from nineteenth-century oratorical lore came to·
mind on reading Lee Clark Mitchell's Witnesses to a Vanishing America. That line
supposedly came from one who stood in awed attendance as Edward Dickinson
Baker, one of the spellbinders of his time, spoke the grave-side eulogy of a
California friend killed in a politically inspired duel. Transported by Baker's ~l
oquence, the man offered this thought: " 'T'were worth dying to be remembered
so."Those witnesses upon whom Mitchell focuses his attention sometimes appear
as distressed at the vanquishing and death of much of natural America as Baker
was when his fellow Republican was killed in 1859. And the propensity for intense
remembering and repining of a wilderness undone constitutes an important cultural current, whether expressed by Mitchell and others in our time or by those
in the time that Mitchell studies.
Needless to say, most of us have quantum-leaped from the views of our Christian
ancestry, from that emblematic figure described by Perry Miller long since as
that "hard-bitten Calvinist [who] reminded his people of ancient distinctions
between nature and grace." If that "hard-bitten Calvinist" lays little claim upon
our attention, one supposes that a hard-bitten Darwinist might, say with that
contemplation of a "tangled bank" with its reminder of the "war of nature" at the
end of Origin of Species, or with the conclusion of Descent of Man where we find
that stern reminder of how "a savage in his native land" actually existed.
Dark thoughts about nature and natural man, whether Calvin's or Darwin's,
have little place in Mitchell's account. Roughly in the 1820s, he contends, doubts
began to take hold regarding the "destruction of a wilderness" (p. xiii). As an
explanatory mechanism anxiety comes forth quite, frequently these times, and
surely it does yeoman service here. "Anxiety about the wilderness gusted fitfully
. . . "(pp. 28-29), and the fitfulness of those anxiety-stricken beholders increased
as the century moved along. By 1900 that anxiety, channelled and magnified now
by cultural relativism, begot "self-revulsion" (p. 261). "Increasingly respectful
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admiration for native tribes," for example, led to a "devastating indictment of
American society from the very perspective offered by tribal life" (p. 255).
As the foregoing should indicate, Mitchell has written a bold book-bold in
scope, bold in interpretation, and bold in the theoretical base of the interpretation.
Though his academic moorings are in American literature, the author ventures
into a variety of areas. Mitchell chooses his witnesses not only from appropriate
literary figures but from among traders, historians, missionaries, painters, photographers, anthropologists, and yet others. That endeavor involves much overview and synthesis, and, perhaps inevitably, it betrays here and there what some
might consider a questionable reading. The intellectual historian, for example,
might wonder about the employment of Theodore Parker (pp. 226, 257). Did
Parker's quarrel with Prescott's History ofthe Conquest of Mexico reflect solicitude
for Aztec civilization nearly as much as it did execration of Spanish and Catholic
civilization? Would the western historian think of Irving's Astoria as attempting
"the definitive history of western riverboatmen" as well as of "fur traders" (p. 27)?
Would the student of Pacific Northwest history accept the placement ofJames G.
Swan not only among the ranks of "serious ethnographers" but also among the
ranks of "dedicated profeSSionals" (p. 185)?
In turn, Mitchell shows boldness in construing and interpreting the material
he has selected from that variety of sources, and again the results are mixed. In
itself the following assertion has much to commend it: "Our nineteenth-century
predecessors swaggered with less thoughtless confidence than the accepted historical record suggests. . ." (p. xvi). Indeed I find such a contention so compelling
that I have elsewhere volunteered some thoughts very much along that line (Lewis
O. Saum, The Popular Mood ofPre-Civil War America, [1980]). I would, however,
be exceedingly reluctant to ascribe much if any of that comparative lack of swagger
to concern over "issues of conservation, endangered wildlife, and native American
rights" (p. xvi). As William H. Shurr's Rappaccini's Children: American Writers
in a Calvinist World (1981) has very recently indicated in the literary sphere,
swagger simply would not comport with the still vigorous legacy that'the nineteenth century received from the dour Genevan. The anxieties were old and
theological far more than they were new and ecological.
Too frequently the material under scrutiny seems to do something less than
the author maintains. For example, even in a mention of an obligingly "didactic"
Thomas Cole painting the author did a bit more managing than seemed appropriate. That painting, Landscape: The Wilderness Axeman, appears as illustration,
and the author informs us that it "presents a woodman senselessly attacking a
tree in the midst of a clearing he has already hacked out of the forest" (p. 37).
Here, as the sentence closes; the author provides footnote citation to a page of
Richard Rudisill's Mirror Image: The Influence of the Daguerreotype on American
Society (1971). But Rudisill's treatment of that painting has a slightly but tellingly
different tone. Rudisill describes an axeman "in the center of the canvas attacking
a tree while around him is a clearing he has hacked out of the forest." Mitchell
appropriates two tendential adverbs-"senselessly" and "already. "There is nothing
inherently "senseless" about chopping up a tree that one has felled. "Already"
seems to suggest that the axeman might have been expected to have sated his
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irrational wantonness in clearing a field and, were he not a rapacious energumen,
to have left the firewood unchopped, In his lecture remarks that Rudisill quotes
on that page, Cole said his was a "regret," not a "complaint." Mitchell comes
close to expunging that disclaimer.
Simply, Mitchell confronts the hard reality that his witnesses show reluctance
to oblige him with clearly stated evidence of their feelings. Not everyone will be
satisfied by the abundance of such locutions as that, of these witnesses, "many
reflect no specific urge to preserve a wilderness vision" (p. 29). After a similar
acknowledgment in treating frontier photographers, the author offers the following: "Yet their work, bankruptcies, and broken homes tacitly attest to costly,
arduous commitments" (pp. 73-74). Work, bankruptcies, and broken homes have
been known to attest to things far removed from worry over a vanishing wilderness.
The author's resourcefulness is not entirely ill-used. Pensiveness pervaded the
American setting, and the detection of it becomes all but inevitable when we
focus our attention upon those in a retrospective mood. To find, for example,
environmental implications in the formation of state historical societies seems,
however ingenious, somewhat beside the point. Such implications may have
entered, but the unembroidered commemorative and nostalgic dimensions would
by far preponderate. Does it tell us very much to label such efforts "an ever more
conscious race against time and progress" (p. 79)? If one were among a handful
of embarrassed witnesses to a small-town Veterans' Day parade in November 1981,
one could say as much, or as little. Those founders of historical societies were
putting things, to use Emerson's terms, in "the amber of memory." That is all but
unutterably fundamental. One could, if one were of a mind, make an environmental statement of "Woodman, Spare that Tree," but to do so would transform
its sentiment into what would be at best the ancillary and at worst the clearly
irrelevant.
Melancholy inheres in photographs. They too are exercises in retrospect, and
few of us need reminders from Susan Sontag about a " 'mournful vision of loss.' "
Immediately after the Sontag reminder, Mitchell generalizes as follows: "The West
specifically, and the Indian in particular, emblematized all that was changing. In
many documentary photographs made through the course of the century, a 'vision
of loss' confronts the viewer" (p. 149). That is quite true, and quite self-evident.
And we need not rely on the West or the Indian to do the emblematizing, though
M. Gidley's beautiful new book, Kopet: A Documentary Narrative ofChiefJoseph's
Last Years (1981), with its compelling photographic illustrations from Edward S.
Curtis and others, could hardly be excelled if one wished to use such emblems.
But the matter is more comprehensively grave than that illustration suggests.
Thus Ben Maddow, himself professionally involved in pictographic arts, remarked
in A Sunday Between Wars: The Course ofAmerican Life from 1865 to 1917 (1979)
that "[ t]here are no smiling Indians in nineteenth-century photographs." Here he
mentioned the Indian notion that a likeness appropriated a part of the soul and
thereby diminished a man. "And in a sense," Maddow ventured, "they were right:
Every image of oneself, even in a mirror, diminishes one's inflated fantasy" (p.
43). Very recently Jane Sugden presented New England Past: Photographs 18801915 (1981), and she quoted Brooks Adams to good, morose purpose: "The world
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is tired of us" (p. 8). Had we accepted the somewhat over-wrought constructions
placed by Michael Lesy on the visual bombardment of his Wisconsin Death Trip
(1973) a few years ago, we might have written off all of small-town, turn-of-thecentury America as a colossal psychopathic ward, instead of recognizing that a
"vision ofloss"-unprepossessing, ill at ease, graceless and even pitiable common
people--confronted us. If the point required reinforcing we could simply turn to
the pages of that arresting book that featured the death photos of children readied
for burial. Here, as almost anywhere else, the photo gives visual evidence that
what was no longer is.
All in all, though Mitchell seems quite right in urging that there was a good
deal more spiritual disquietude in nineteenth-century America than we sometimes
suppose, he may have ascribed rather too much of it to concern over nature.
"Deep resistance to the devastation" wrought by westward expansion seems a
quite apt way of discussing Bayard Taylor, but as we move into the next paragraph
and the next page, enlarging the scope "[fjrom private diarists to famous writers,
housewives to professional journalists" (pp. 31-32), uneasiness is in order. The
unsophisticated reserved their distress about "westward progress," not for "wounds
on the land," but for wounds inflicted on the religious and social fabric by the
westering process (Saum, The Popular Mood of Pre-Civil War America, especially
Chapter 8).
Simply, one wonders about the pervasiveness of the particular misgivings upon
which the book is based, and one wonders about the author's assessment of that
pervasiveness. Here and there the reader encounters qualifiers and disclaimers
indicating that we should be cautious in generalizing from what the Bayard Taylors
were expressing. Elsewhere, however, we seem to assume a more expansive
posture, as when we find that the individuals treated in the book should not be
seen as "uniquely perceptive figures but as spokesmen for a broad intellectual
movement shared with their many less articulate contemporaries" (p. xvi). And
surely, one is being allowed to believe more than one should when one reads that
by the end of the nineteenth century "[r]esistance to militant missionizing had
swollen into a flood tide of public opinion, and alienation from contemporary
society expressed itself more outspokenly against America's ruthless imperialism
in the Philippines, in China, in Central America, and, not least, in the American
West, where the frontier was closing" (pp. 257-58). But, Mitchell has written a
bold book.
Perhaps the boldest aspect of this challenging and in some ways admirable work
is in its shift or its intensification of the theoretical base for interpretation. Some
of us may not be sufficiently alert at the outset when Mitchell calls for "a revision
in our notions" of the American past "by revealing the ambivalence felt among
even those who participated in the nation's triumphant conquest of the wilderness"
(p. xiv). The familiar ring is deceptive. A half century and more ago the theoretical
base for the scrutiny of such "ambivalence" would have been firmly in the realms
of philosophical and literary conventions. Philosophers George Boas and A. O.
Lovejoy did much to inform us of such currents in antiquity, and they were joined
in bringing the story forward by such literary scholars as Hoxie Neale Fairchild
and Chauncey Brewster Tinker. One might have supposed that America-for
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shame or for glory-had had a comparative immunity to these primitivistic notions.
What Vernon Louis Parrington called The Romantic Revolution in America (1927)
was, as he put it at the outset, "economic romance" (p. v).
In time our scholars discerned other ingredients of America's nineteenth-century mood, ingredients that bore a resemblance to what the Lovejoys and Fairchilds had studied in other settings. A romantic and primitivistic strain emerged,
and that strain often seemed hardly more than a popularized version of Byron or
Rousseau. But when such examinations of American culture came of age, they
did so with a somewhat revised motive force. Though Roy Harvey Pearce's The
Savages ofAmerica: A Study of the Indian and the Idea of Civilization (1953) was
dedicated to A. O. Lovejoy and showed much of his influence, it and a good many
other things rendered philosophical and literary conventions into more flexible
symbols and myths. Henry Nash Smith's Virgin Land: The American West as
Symbol and Myth (1950) stands as the cardinal event. That publication did much
to inspire and inform portrayals of an American past that took a kinder view of
the natural condition. And forthwith, that fonder view received illumination from
the theoretical formulations of Mircea Eliade, especially from his Cosmos and
History: The Myth ofthe Eternal Return (1949), which became available in English
early in the 1950s. We were now better prepared to see that the American past
had had something more than "economic" romance and a rage for progress.
The ambivalence our nineteenth-century ancestors felt took on several shadings
'in the literature that followed Virgin Land. John W. Ward's Andrew Jackson:
Symbol for an Age (1955) presented Americans who offered rather straightforward
prescriptions for maintaining a middle ground between the unduly natural and
the unduly civilized. The tone was mediational, and to the Jacksonians the ideal
American scene was "a cornfield surrounded by a split rail fence" (p. 33). A decade
after Ward's book, maturation rather than mediation provided the informing spirit
for a couple of important works in this genre, and the tone was appropriately
more dour. Leo Marx's The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral
Ideal (1964) concluded with "Epilogue: The Garden ofAshes" wherein the "American hero is either dead or totally alienated from society, alone and powerless,
like the evicted shepherd of Virgil's eclogue. And if, at the same time, he pays a
tribute to the image of a green landscape, it is likely to be ironic and bitter" (p.
364). Another book, Loren Baritz's City on a Hill: A History of Ideas and Myths
in America (1964), closed with a chapter on the ever-puzzling but ever-obliging
Melville, the last lines of which depicted that pensive and dolorous witness as
follows: "He had seen the passing of the land and the development of civilization. . . . The land had come of age, and age was time and tragedy and the end"
(p. 331).
Mitchell has gone boldly beyond all of these. He does not confine himself to
the somber lucubrations of an isolated and prescient Melville nor to the twentiethcentury parallel in Marx's depiction of Jay Gatsby's futile resistance to the "root
conflict of our culture." He goes beyond Roderick Nash's Wilderness and the
American Mind (1967) by giving large and explicit coverage to the image of the
Indian and by multiplying Nash's handful of prototypical figures. Indeed his audacity does not suffer in comparison to Leslie Fiedler's The Return ofthe Vanishing
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American, like Nash's book first published in 1967. Fiedler's remarkable foray
had to settle largely for fictive, mythic archetypal figures acting as spiritual precursors of the "Ultimate Westerner" who inhabits "the West of Here and Now,
rather than There and Then-the West of Madness" (pp. 181, 185). To be sure,
Mitchell does not extend his wilderness mission into the lush undergrowth of the
counter culture, but his contentions if not always his evidence render Fiedler's
views prodigiously closer to believable, though still a good distance removed.
"The reader may object that I am talking nonsense"-that recognition came
near the outset of the previously quoted essay by Perry Miller in the 1955 Harvard
Theological Review. Therein he told us that Americans ignored the message of
that "still hard-bitten Calvinist" about the dangers of nature, and he impressionistically urged that an almost ecological concern permeated pre-Civil War America. Miller, it seems to me, allowed us to mislead ourselves when he neglected
to emphasize a separation or gradation at the end of that essay. "[T]he American,
or at least the American artist," he blurringly wrote, "cherishes in his innermost
being the impulse to reject completely the gospel of civilization. . . ." The chasm
between the "American" and the "American artist" is not at all susceptible to this
blithe bridging. Mitchell blurs and bridges in a way quite analogous to Miller's;
but Mitchell out-does Miller too. In fact, Miller's message came from an earlier
age; he did not celebrate that above-mentioned "impulse" to go native. Indeed
his closing lines enjoined American religion to examine "with the severest selfcriticism, the course on which it so blithely embarked a century ago, when it
dallied with the sublime and failed to comprehend the sinister dynamic of Nature. "
Such an admonition would appear absurdly out of place in Mitchell's depiction.
In 1981, Lee Clark Mitchell, a very young scholar, published his first book, an
audacious and ambitious synthesis of a great amount of material informed throughout by an arresting and consistent thesis. In 1981, Ray Allen Billington published
his last scholarly book, Land of Savagery, Land of Promise: The European Image
of the American Frontier. The birth dates of the two men are separated by more
than fifty years, and, bearing in mind that the subject matter of the two books is
paralIel but not identical, that half-century may help explain a disparity of construction between the two. Many of us would have been predisposed to the view
that Billington's Europeans, some of them "witnesses," some of them fireside
travelIers, would have entertained a more solicitous idea of America's natural and
frontier realm. But, if both of these accounts are to be credited, that is not the
case. As the nineteenth century moved along in BiIlington's portrayal, those European "image-makers" "increasingly agreed on one point: that Nature was an evil
to be subdued, not a god to be worshipped" (p. 80).
Conceivably, both scholars are right; but BilIington seems substantialIy more
so. MitchelI's book will appeal to many, and it wilI deserve nearly all of the approval
it receives. But its discernment of an ecological concern takes on fuIler form than
many of us would accept. In the William and Mary Quarterly (July 1972) James
AxtelI opened an essay regarding Indians and whites in the colonial setting with
a line from the poet Marianne Moore. That line involved a "philosophy of the
wilderness," a philosophy "to combat which one must stand outside and laugh
since to go in is to be lost." There is no laughing at a wilderness as compelIing
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as that portrayed by Mitchell, by his "witnesses," and by their other remembrancers, but there is the strong inclination yet in some of us to stand outside
lest we go in and be lost in that insinuating and intoxicating realm. And I conclude
that that reaction would have gained the approval of more of our nineteenthcentury ancestors than Mitchell's account would have us believe.

BOOK NOTES
The Comstock Lode of Nevada provided an important and colorful chapter in
the history ofAmerican mining and was described in varying ways by such writers
as Mark Twain and Dan De Quille. Charles H. Shinn, who previously had written
about mining camp government, added The Story of the Mine, as Illustrated by
the Great Comstock Lode of Nevada (1896) to the body of Comstock literature.
While not of the quality of De Quille's work, The Story of the Mine (University
of Nevada Press, paper, $6.50) provides useful information on western mining.
Health, Wealth and Pleasure in Colorado and New Mexico (Museum of New
Mexico Press, paper, $4.95) is an example of the promotional literature produced
by western railroads in the nineteenth century. It is an example of railroad boosterism and a tour guide to the places on the route of the Denver and Rio Grande
Western Railroad, a portion of which ran through New Mexico.
In recent years there have been several new books relating to the Lewis and
Clark expedition. Sacagawea of the Lewis and Clark Expedition by Ella E. Clark
and MargotEdmunds (University of California Press, cloth, $10.95) is a brief study
of Sacagawea.
Each year the Sun Valley (Idaho) Center for the Arts and Humanities holds
conferences on important topics relating to the American West. In 1980 a variety
of experts gathered at Sun Valley to discuss the landscape between the Sierras
and the Colorado Front Range, and the results were recently published as That
Awesome Space: Human Interaction with the Intermountain Landscape, edited
by E. Richard Hart (Westwater Press, paper, $8.95). Included are comments on
western art, film, history, Indian land use, and current issues such as the M-X
missile system.
America's Energy Famine: Its Cause and Cure by Ruth Sheldon Knowles (University of Oklahoma Press, cloth, $14.95) is an analysis of America's energy crisis
and of future developments, including alternate sources of energy. Some portions
of this timely book appeared previously in Knowles's America's Oil Famine.
Several small items have been recently published, including Letters to La Bandera Americana, 1935-1938, translated by Julian Josue Vigil (Editorial Telarana,
Box 3187, Las Vegas, N. Mex. 87701), and Life of a Sheriff by Virginia Louise
Tompkins (Vantage Press, cloth, $5.95). The former is a collection of letters on a
wide variety of topics published in La Bandera Americana, a weekly newspaper
in Albuquerque. It includes Spanish and English texts. The latter is a novella
about a sheriff in a small Arizona town.
Recent reprints include the works of noted southwestern authors Larry McMurtry
and J. Frank Dobie. McMurtry, author of The Last Picture Show and Horseman,
Pass By, which was filmed as Hud, is a major contemporary author. All My Friends
Are Going to Be Strangers (UNM Press, paper, $6.95, with an afterword by
Raymond L. Neinstein) is set in the Southwest, and, like other McMurtry novels,
includes social commentary on recent Texas life. Dobie's books are being reprinted
by the University of Texas Press. Recent issues include I'll Tell You a Tale (paper,
$7.95) and the well-known A Vaquero of the Brush Country (paper, $8.9.5). The
former, a collection of tales typical of Dobie's work, provides a good introduction
to those who have not yet read anything by this famous folklorist. The latter is a
classic. It is a story of the cattle business of southwest Texas and of John Young,
a vaquero of the brush country.

Book Reviews
THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE STONY MOUNTAINS: EXPLORING THE WEST FROM
MONTICELLO. By Donald Jackson. Champaign: University of Illinois Press,
1981. Pp. xii, 339. Illus., notes, bibliog., index. $19.95.
AT AGATHERING OF American Nobel Prize winners in the White House, President
John F. Kennedy said that it was "probably the greatest concentration of talent
and genius in this house, except for perhaps those times when Thomas Jefferson
ate alone." This volume, by a noted historian and editor, explores one part of that
great "talent and genius." Many books promise more than they deliver; this one
delivers even more than it promises. It tells not only of Jefferson's interest in the
Stony Mountains, but also his attention to the West in general, and his lifelong
study of geography.
Jefferson's attraction to the West began when, as a youth, he accompanied his
father when he surveyed in Virginia. Even while in France as our representative,
Jefferson was concerned about exploring in the vast areas of tne continent. While
he served as our ambassador to France, as secretary of state, and as vice-president,
he continued his interest in exploring the West, making several attempts, all of
which failed.
When he became president, however, he saw his way clear. Stimulated by the
publication of Alexander Mackenzie's book on his trip to the Pacific, Jefferson
brought to fruition his long-held plans. After purchasing Louisiana he sent Lewis
and Clark on their memorable journey. Jackson tells their story concisely but with
all the essentials. In addition, Jefferson dispatched Pike to the Southwest, and
several other exploration teams provided more information to the anxious scholar.
Not all his knowledge came from the field. While in Europe Jefferson began
to collect books he could find on America, a practice that he continued when he
returned home. By 1815, when it was sold to form the nucleus of the Library of
Congress, his collection totaled 6,000 volumes; not all were geography books, of
course, but the majority were.
Jackson's style is both scholarly and readable. He quotes extensively from Jefferson's writings, but always with the proper introduction, so that we know what
we are to learn. The book is well arranged, basically chronologically, but with
chapters on special subjects. There are fifteen maps, of varying value, but no
other illustrations. This is an excellent volume, worthy of a place in personal,
public, or college libraries.

Boise State University

JOHN A. CAYLOR
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STEPHEN LONG AND AMERICAN FRONTIER EXPLORATION. By Roger L. Nichols and
Patrick L. Halley. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1980. Pp. 276. lIlus.,
appendix, bibliog., notes, index. $19.50.
"STEPHEN LONG'S WORK has been ignored, misunderstood, or criticised for decades. It is time to reexamine his contributions to exploration and to place him in
the broader context of American geographical and intellectual growth during the
early years of the nineteenth century," say the authors in their introduction to
the book. They also note that they are not presenting a biography of Stephen H.
Long, but an examination of "his actions as a promoter and leader of frontier
exploration between 1816 and 1824."
After sketching Long's early years, the authors discuss his initial experiences
as a member of the United States Army's elite Corps of Topographical Engineers.
Of most importance were two journeys into the upper Mississippi Valley to report
on existing military posts and to make recommendations for new post sites. Little
exploration was involved, but Long was introduced to the western frontier, developed a lasting interest in its little-known reaches, and began to formulate his
ideas in regard to future exploration.
The greater portion of the book is devoted to Long's three major expeditions,
the "Scientific Expedition" of 1829-30, the expedition to the Rocky Mountains of
1820 (to which the most space is accorded), and the northern expedition of 1823.
Due attention is given to the preparations undertaken in advance of the several
expeditions as well as the reports and publications that emanated from them.
Long's innovations, such as the employment of scientifically trained personnel
and the attempt to make use of a steamboat to facilitate exploration, arc described.
Adequate attention is given to the other members of the expeditions and their
achievements, or inadequacies, recorded. Long's subsequent career is treated
briefly, and the text closes with an assessment of Long as an explorer.
Some of Long's contemporaries disparaged what they considered his failure to
accomplish all that he was sent out to do, and he has been subjected to much
adverse criticism ever since. Particularly, his inability to find the Red River and
his attachment of the label "Great American Desert" to part of the Plains region
have been singled out for comment. Because the authors believe Long has been
unjustly maligned, they consistently call attention to his achievements, such as
the genuine contributions to scientific knowledge that were a product of his
expeditions and the fact that, unlike the findings ofthe Lewis and Clark expedition,
they were made available to the public without delay. The authors also discuss
Long's shortcomings, in some cases suggesting the reasons for them. In the process
of praising or finding fault with Long the authors sometimes overstate their arguments and indulge in unnecessary repetition. The final result is probably a
reasonable estimate of Long's accomplishments, but it is less certain that his
reputation as an explorer has been enhanced.
The book includes an appendix, listing the publications in English resulting
from Long's expeditions. The text is largely free from typographical errors, but
there are two incorrect dates on page 184 and a number of faulty page citations
in the index.
Santa Fe

ROBERT W. FRAZER
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LAW FOR THE ELEPHANT: PROPERTY AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR ON THE OVERLAND
TRAIL. By John Phillip Reid. San Marino, Calif.: Huntington Library, 1980. Pp.
x, 437. Illus., notes, bibliog., index. $18.50.
WHEN URBAN VIOLENCE ERUPTED in the United States during the 1960s and 70s,
some historians and social scientists quickly associated it with our "lawless" frontier
heritage-perhaps too quickly. For now a significant number of our colleagues,
particularly those in legal history, find that crime on the western fringes of American society was no more prevalent than in the established sections to the east.
Law professor John Phillip Reid's latest book, an incisive study of social behavior
on the trails of California and Oregon, debunks the myth of frontier lawlessness.
Reid's fundamental premise is that beneath American society is a behaviorism
based on law, and his case in point is property that he cleverly symbolizes in his
book and chapter titles as the Elephant. Mter analyzing an impressive assortment
of diaries and journ~ls, Reid concludes: "Definitions of property law were understood by nineteenth-century Americans on the overland trail, personal rights to
property were respected, and respect for property provided those nineteenthcentury Americans with a norm for social behavior" (p. 335).
Only an attorney could discover sufficient commentary on property in emigrants'
diaries to form fourteen chapters. Reid, holder of three law degrees as well as a
master's in history, grapples with every conceivable problem attendant to ownership. Only the three chapters that deal with the various types ofproperty holding
become burdensome to readers untutored in the law.
Though Reid's work contains interesting vignettes of trail life, he concentrates
on the role of property and its impact on behavior. Indeed, the author presents
a convincing case in support ofthe rule ofproperty law even in the face ofstarvation
and in the absence of enforcement institutions. Emigrants followed principles of
abandonment and appropriation scrupulously, regardless of how desperate their
situation. The ultimate test of property rights was the willingness of travelers, in
the face of death, to pay exorbitant prices for food or water that was often sold
for as much as $1 per quart. Reid uncovered only rare acts of violence under the
most extraordinary temptations.
That Reid mastered his abundant manuscript sources, there is no doubt. His
copious notes appear at the bottom of the pages, and a thirty-four-page ShortTitle List facilitates reference to the diaries and journals. Despite a degree of
redundancy, his facile prose permits the author to reduce complex legal concepts
to terms readily understood by laymen. Unfortunately, Reid occasionally exhibits
a pejorative attitude toward historians who are not formally trained in the law.
On p. 190, for instance, he observes that "perhaps lawyers see more than historians." Such annoyances, however, are but minor flaws in a creative and meticulously researched study that reveals much about the nonviolent nature of our
westward movement. It also demonstrates the extent to which western history
remains a viable and eclectic field of research.
University of Southern Mississippi

JOHN D. W. GUICE
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DIPLOMATS IN BUCKSKINS: A HISTORY OF INDIAN DELEGATIONS IN WASHINGTON
CITY. By Herman J. Viola. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press,
1981. Pp. 233. Illus., index, notes, bibliog. $17.50.
ONE ASPECT OF INDIAN-WHITE relations overlooked by scholars has been the many
tribal delegations that made the journey to Washington to confer with leaders of
the government. Most students of Indian history are aware that the delegations
existed, but their significance has never been fully explored. Fortunately, Herman
Viola, of the National Anthropological Archives at the Smithsonian Institution,
realized the importance of the delegations, and in his capable hands Diplorrwts
in Buckskins has emerged as one of the finest contributions to Indian history in
recent years.
Viola has chosen to develop his topic thematically. In a series of well-researched
chapters he reviews every aspect of the Indian delegation story, from how and
why they were invited, to how they were financed, and how they lived while in
the capital. Some of the most fascinating material deals with the boarding houses
and hotels that catered to the Indian trade, the social life of the delegations, and
their ailments and disabilities. There are humorous tales, such as when two rival
Sac and Fox delegations met on the streets of Washington and began throwing
tomahawks at each other. There are many more sad episodes, including the deaths,
murders, and robbery of some tribal representatives.
The interesting and often charming anecdotes of individual delegations are not
what makes the book significant, however. Rather, it is the overall review of one
of the major methods used by the federal government to get the Indian tribes to
accede to its wishes and policies. Viola makes the point that the Indians seldom
understood the real purpose of their visits to the Great Father. Until recent times
most Indians believed they were being honored, and they expected to deal with
federal officials on an equal basis. The government usually had an ulterior motive
in wining and dining the chiefs. Sometimes it was to put them in a favorable
mood to sign a treaty; other times it was to impress the more hostile Indians with
the power and might of the nation. Such tactics often worked. Viola maintains
that Indians who went east were thereafter more inclined to peace. He also notes
some of the federal hypocrisy, such as allowing Indian delegates to spend lavishly
when in town, especially for liquor (one group averaged $8.40 per person a day
for $1.25 a gallon whiskey), while the nation was attempting to prev~nt such
practices within the Indian country. In the end, one is struck with the fact that
the Indians gained little from their diplomatic exchanges with federal officials.
They may have received a few presents and had a good time, but they paid a
great price. As Diplorrwts in Buckskins makes amply clear, some of the most
significant Indian negotiations were conducted not on the frontier, but at the seat
of government. However, that did not assure any more beneficial results.
There are only a few minor flaws in the book. Some materials are repeated,
and at times the author jumps large spans of time, leaving the reader wondering
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what happened in between. By and large, however, this book is a valuable contribution to the literature of Indian-white relations. Viola has shown that there is
still a great deal to be discovered about our past relations with the native American.

Arizona State University

ROBERT A. TRENNERT

TWILIGHT OF PROGRESSIVISM: THE WESTERN REPUBLICAN SENATORSANDTHE NEW
DEAL. By Ronald L. Feinman. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1981. Pp. xiv, 262. Illus., notes, bibliog., index. $18.50.
RONALD FEINMAN HAS ATTEMPTED a task of enormous proportions. He has chosen
twelve progressive Republican senators and has documented how they responded
to Franklin Roosevelt, the New Deal, and Roosevelt diplomacy. The senators
discussed are William E. Borah of Idaho, George Norris of Nebraska, Hiram
Johnson of California, Charles McNary of Oregon, Arthur Capper of Kansas, Peter
Norbeck of South Dakota, James Couzens of Michigan, Lynn Frazier of North
Dakota, Henrik Shipstead of Minnesota, Robert LaFollette, Jr., of Wisconsin,
Gerald Nye of North Dakota, and Bronson Cutting of New Mexico. During the
1920s the media considered them to be a progressive bloc. However, both Feinman's choice of senators and his calling them "western" senators is questionable.
The descriptive term "western" could have easily been dropped or some of the
midwestern senators omitted, especially Couzens and Shipstead, neither of whom
figures prominently in the narrative, or Clapper who never appears very progressive.
What these politicians have in common is their fairly unanimous support of
Robert LaFollette, Sr., in 1924, their opposition to Herbert Hoover in 1928, and
for the survivors, their avowed isolationism prior to World War II. Many of the
progressives such as Borah, Norris, and Johnson had been involved in the Theodore Roosevelt-led progressive movement and had also battled with Woodrow
Wilson over foreign policy. Their experience and prestige vaulted them into the
forefront of American political history, and they sought to shape the nation's
destiny. Borah, Norris, Johnson, LaFollette, and Nye dominate the text and
deservedly so, but rarely could they agree on anything.
The author skillfully utilizes primary sources to document how Roosevelt used
these progressives in his attempt to carry the banner of reform during the Great
Depression. It is remarkable that the progressive bloc of Republicans was so split
over most New Deal programs. The variety of their individual reactions to the
numerous New Deal measures is discussed. Initially, most thought that they could
work with the Democrat, Roosevelt, but one by one they became disillusioned
over individual pieces of legislation. The chapters on the New Deal are certainly
exceptional in both content and analysis. This is especially true when discussing
the more prominent progressives. Norris and LaFollette voted with FDR in most
instances, but their colleagues were less consistent.
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The final political rupture between the Democratic president and his Republican quasisupporters came over foreign policy, not progressivism. Borah and
Johnson reverted to their post-World War I isolationist philosophy, and Nye
became the leading opponent of Roosevelt's attempts at military preparedness.
For those who fought so hard to defeat collective security in 1919, Roosevelt's
overt and covert methods created frustration.
If Feinman's work has a major weakness, it is a lack of interpretation. The
constant split votes are never adequately explained, nor is evidence presented
that would document the exchanges between the senators. Phillip LaFollette,
Wisconsin's governor and the senator's brother, is discussed more than some of
the highlighted senatorial subjects. However, the final product is an excellent
account of old line progressive response to the New Deal. It is a meritorous effort
and worthy of close inspection.

Utah State University

F. Ross PETERSON

MORMONISM AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE. By Klaus J. Hansen. Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press, 1981. Pp. xviii, 257. Foreword by Martin
E. Marty. Notes, index. $15.00.
"JOSEPH SMITH, RETURNING TO EARTH TODAY, might well wonder if this was indeed
the same church he had founded, given the disappearance ofthe political kingdom,
of economic cooperation, and of plural marriage" (p. 147). In a series of welldeveloped essays, Klaus Hansen discusses this transformation of the Mormon
church from its role as a deviant faith and culture to a denomination now regarded,
in Hansen's view, as an eminently respectable middle class religion exhibiting all
of the virtues of the Protestant ethic.
After an introductory chapter in which interpretations of the birth of Mormonism by authorities in several academic disciplines are examined, the author continues with a perceptive analysis of the new faith, describing it as a quest for
power by ordinary people to whom that quest had been denied in the Jacksonian
world of individualism and competition, Adopting the development of an ideology
of power as a theme, Hansen examines, in succeeding chapters, the innovative
policies derived from divine revelation that provided the badly needed mortar to
mend the cracks caused by the tremors of growing pains in the Morman community.
Acknowledging the crucial and lasting significance of the concept of sealing
marriage and family relationships for eternity, the author shows how other doctrines such as plural marriage, consecration of property to the church, creation
of a political kingdom of the Saints, and exclusion of blacks from the priesthood
served their purpose in the spirit of the time but inevitably disappeared as official
church policy caught up with reality.
Why did the Mormons lose their will to fight for old beliefs? Responding to
this question, Hansen concludes with an apt comparison of the Mormon expe-
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rience to that of the Puritans in their "City Upon a Hill." Like the Puritans, the
Mormons suffered the frustration of isolation from the mainstream of American
growth. The Mormons could only watch from afar as the American republic recorded great achievements, many of them economi~ in nature, in which Mormonism had no part. Finally realizing that Mormonism could wither on the vine
of American prosperity if old barriers to assimilation were not lowered, church
leaders backed reluctantly into the future and made their peace with modem
America.
Hansen's thesis may not be palatable to all of his readers, particularly those in
the Mormon church who may detect an association of materialistic motivation in
the author's understanding of the redefinition of church doctrines. However, many
others will agree with Martin Marty, editor of the Chicago History of American
Religion series, who included Hansen's study in this distinguished collection
because the paradoxes of Mormon development necessitated the kind of full-range
approach displayed by the author. Not for the casual reader, this work occasionally
plumbs the depths of very deep waters when groping for an understanding of
Mormonism and the American experience. But the conclusions drawn from these
soundings are certainly noteworthy, and they should not be ignored by serious
students of the impact of rel!gion on the development of American society.

University of Colorado, Colorado Springs

NORMAN

J.

BENDER

THE SPANISH CROWN AND THE DEFENSE OF THE CARIBBEAN. 1535-1585: PRECEDENT. PATRIMONIALISM. AND ROYAL PARSIMONY. By Paul E. Hoffman. Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980. Pp. 312. Illus., notes, appendixes, gloss., bibliog., index. $30. ?D.
STUDENTS OF EARLY COLONIAL Caribbean history have tended to dismiss the efforts
of the Spanish Crown to defend their colonies, particularly prior to Drake's raid
of 1586. Professor Hoffman's new, comprehensive study of the period sets rather
formidable obstacles in the way of continued acceptance of this judgment.
This volume is based on solid research in Spanish and Caribbean archival
treasury records as well as in printed sources. The author has presented a persuasive and balanced account of how the Spanish patrolled the Caribbean and the
sea lanes to Spain, built and garrisoned fortifications, and alerted its colonists to
the dangers of French and English attacks. Hoffman clearly describes the conflict
between the Crown's duty to the nation and its people and the Crown's pocketbook-patrimonialism and parsimony-which often caused a confusing on againoff again approach to defense. The book is carefully structured, using quantitative
methods within a chronological historical setting to provide much of the intellectual framework necessary to understand Hoffman's thesis.
Hoffman breaks his study of events into four main periods: a period during
which precedents were taking shape and where the Crown expected individuals
to provide for their defense, 1535-1547; a period where open naval warfare forced
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the Crown to spend its funds, 1548-1563; a period where a system for adequate
defense of commerce developed, 15lW-1577; and, finally, a period when the
system was refined and neglected, 1578-1585. The author selected the periods
based on European wars; actually, the periodization was practically forced on
Hoffman by his loose definition of "Corsair" as, "Any ship and crew, or member
of that crew, sailing in the Spanish Indies without license from the Casa de
Contrataci6n at Seville, or sailing to attack Spanish shipping off the Iberian
Peninsula" (p. 265). Thus it is not surprising, even to the "statistically naive" (p.
16), to find in Illustration 1 (p. 12) that periods of corsair incidents coincided with
peak periods of defense spending.
Hoffman is a gifted historian with a clear understanding of naval technology
and warfare. While developing the changing patterns of corsair activity and the
Spanish strategic and tactical adjustments to meet the challenge, the author does
not neglect the historical, diplomatic, ·and economic realities of the age. Hoffman
concludes that the Spanish defense of its colonies was neither neglected nor a
military failure. His thesis is clear and convincing.
While it is difficult to find fault with Hoffman's superior historical craftsmanship,
one wonders, however, if the appendix on methodology is really necessary. The
pages concerning computer card layout and use of the keypunch are particularly
painful, for, after all, Hoffman has made only minimal use of the computer,
restricted mostly to storing data for retrieval and to managing his ample body of
documentation. Hoffman's charts and graphs show no meaningful mathematical
analysis. Of course, none is needed because he has clearly proved his case by
traditional historical analysis of his exhaustive archival material.
Professor Hoffman has written a valuable and useful book that will be a great
help to scholars and should stimulate additional research on his subject. As a
historical contribution it is an excellent book: thoroughly researched, copiously
documented, precise in its abundant details, clearly presented, and conservative
in its general conclusions.

Purdue University

WILLIAM COLLINS

FELIX DIAZ, THE PORFIRIANS. AND THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION. By Peter V. N.
Henderson. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981. Pp. xi, 239. Appendixes, notes, bibliog., index. $18.50.
MEXICO'S LEADERS: THEIR EDUCATION AND RECRUITMENT. By Roderic A. Camp.
Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1980. Pp. xvi, 259. Notes, bibliog., index,
appendixes. $12.50 paper, $28.50 cloth.
THOUGH SET IN DISTINCTLY different time frames, these books measure the main
road to Mexican political power. Henderson treats the career of a political loser
during the dictatorship of Porfirio Dfaz and the revolution that unravelled it,
while Camp studies the success pattern of the country's more contemporary leadership. In both cases, personalism, as opposed to merit or ideology, fuels the way
into public life. Of course, the option of rebellion remains open for dissidents.
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Henderson has written a rather standard political biography of Felix Diaz,
nephew of the dictator, who had pretentions to the presidency, but neither the
style nor the intelligence to achieve it. Felix Diaz was greedy, unscrupulous,
opportunistic, and unlucky. The dictator had to curb the unabashed ambitions of
his nephew by frustrating his political campaigns and by sending him into occasional exile. Personalism works in both directions. Yet because he was the dictator's
nephew, Felix Diaz remained politically viable within the vicious competition
that characterized the Porfirian political system and destabilized the dictatorship.
Henderson maintains that during the revolution (1910-1917) the nation's major
presidential contenders, such as Felix Diaz, had similar plans for Mexico's future.
All were somewhat anticlerical and quite friendly toward foreign investment, a
conclusion that seems over-simplified, if not wrong. Felix Diaz lost out, the
author assumes, because he could not shake the stigma of his name, which reminded people of the overthrown dictatorship. More likely, while Felix Diaz
flirted about the halls of political power, he never had much chance to seize and
hold the presidency. He was used by others for their political gain and then
discarded.
Camp ties current political success in Mexico to the national university. With
the aid of computer analysis he examines the careers of some 300 political leaders
who held high office between 1935 and 1975. Among the group he found that
82% held university and professional degrees (in a country where very few attend
college), and that two-thirds came from the National University, mainly from the
schools of law and engineering, some from .medicine, and an increasing number
from economics. Knowledge and skills acquired at the university are, of course,
important, but for students eventual employment and promotion in public life
depend upon their contacts with politicized professors. As a large percentage of
those in government are also part-time teachers, professors have the opportunity
to screen their pupils for political potential and to guide them into channels that
will abet or block their advancement in the public sector. Students interested in
public service acquiesce because they see it as the only way into Mexico's undemocratic political system.
The author also explains Mexico's political stability through the relationship
between government and the university. The university is a homogenizing force.
All the tea~hers and students may not think alike, "but they all come from urban,
middleclass backgrounds and emerge from their university experience with values
that tie them together" (pp. 12, 193). Camp concludes: "Those who want to succeed
in the Mexican political system, by their third or fourth year in professional school,
have allowed themselves, in terms of their behavior, to conform to the practices
of that system, rather than to challenge it. They do not mold the system; it molds
them." The official party permits limited ideological debate, but ideology has little
to do with promotion. "Instead, the emphasis is placed on interpersonal political
skills, administrative abilities, individual discipline, and loyalty to upwardly mobile mentors" (p. 193).
Any student of Mexican affairs has friends who have followed the path outlined
by Camp, and all of us also know of exceptions. But generally his book confirms
our impressions. Still it seems that there is a good deal more antigovernment
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discussion and movement within the university than Camp indicates and the
weeding out process among political hopefuls is much more severe than he projects. Yet his book remains an important, scholarly contribution to our knowledge.
Henderson's book also has its merits, especially in its description of the in-fighting
that marked the Porfirian order, but before this aspect of Mexican political life
can be understood, scholars will have to apply their talents to the voluminous
Porfirio Diaz Archive that only recently has become available for use.
San Diego State University
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CHICANOS IN ACHANGING SOCIETY; FROM MEXICAN PUEBLOS TO AMERICAN BARRIOS IN SANTA BARBARA AND SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, 1848-1930. By Albert Camarillo. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979. Pp, xiii, 326. Illus.,
notes, bibliog., index, $17.95 cloth, $7,95 paper.
THIS STUDY EXAMINES the development of Chicano communities in southern California from the termination of the Mexican War through the onset of the Great
Depression. The work concentrates primarily upon the city of Santa Barbara, but
it also makes comparisons to Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Bernardino. Utilizing quantitative analysis of data culled from census manuscripts and city directories, plus a number of oral history interviews of elderly Chicanos, Albert
Camarillo has produced a solid, workmanlike volume in his attempt to understand
Chicano society "from the bottom up" (p. 4).
Camarillo contends that twentieth-century Chicano history is predicated upon
events that took place during the second half of the nineteenth century. It was
during this period that the basic political, social, and economic relationships
between Chicanos and Anglos were forged, relationships that, Camarillo argues,
endure to this day. Chicanos in southern California during the period 1850 through
1900 underwent a devastating loss of political, social, and economic power that
insured their subordination as a segregated minority.
Mass Anglo migration into southern California after the Mexican War quickly
eroded the political strength of the indigenous Mexican population. By the early
1870s in Santa Barbara, for example, Anglos had gained numerical ascendancy
and had begun to manipulate political power to their advantage through such
devices as gerrymandering. At the same time, Chicanos fell victim to two processes
that Camarillo terms "barrioization" and "proletarianization." With the influx of
Anglo population, the Mexican community in southern California cities soon became relegated to residentially and socially segregated neighborhoods, Pueblos
were transformed into barrios, Concurrently, American industrial capitalism destroyed the pastoral economy of southern California and along with it the economic
status of native residents of Mexican heritage. As Californios lost their land and
experienced downward social mobility and as Anglo business interests encouraged
fresh immigration from Mexico to replace their restricted Asian labor supply, the
overwhelming majority of Chicanos in southern California became entrapped in
a homogenous working class defined by race. The data reveal that regardless of
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how long a Chicano or Chicana remained at a particular job in Santa Barbara, he
or she was most unlikely to ever emerge from the lowest occupational strata.
While the contours of the processes of economic and social stratification and
segregation have been well known to students of Chicano and ethnic history for
some time, Camarillo's painstaking and detailed research confirms them. It is in
his treatment of the relationship between native-born Mexicans in Santa Barbara
and recent immigrants frolJl Mexico that Camarillo presents fresh and valuable
insights. Camarillo contends that considerable social and residential distance existed between the two groups as the native born attempted to disassociate themselves from the immigrants. Social interaction and intermarriage between the two
groups were rare as the native born, or "Spanish" as they preferred to call themselves, kept their distance from newcomers to avoid being stigmatized by Anglos
as unwanted immigrants. This social distancing phenomenon occurred despite
the fact that the economic, social, and political status of native-born and immigrant
Mexicans in Santa Barbara was essentially identical and Anglos tended to view
all Chicanos in the same racial terms. Distance between the two groups began
to diminish after the Great Depression. By that time, both groups had experienced
decades of low status manual labor. Neither enjoyed the social mobility of Anglo
workers. In fact, Camarillo argues, Mexicans fell victim to downward occupational
mobility in the twentieth century as frequently as they experienced upward mobility.
Chicanos in a Changing Society represents an important contribution to Chicano history. The book's value is enhanced by the inclusion of some interesting
photographs illustrating the lives and labors of Chicanos in late nineteenth and
early twentieth-century southern California.

Medical College of Virginia
Virginia Commonwealth University
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OPERATION WETBACK: THE MASS DEPORTATION OF MEXICAN UNDOCUMENTED
WORKERS IN 1954. By Juan Ramon Garcia. Contributions in Ethnic Studies,
no. 2. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. Pp. xviii, 268. Illus., appendixes, bibliog., index, notes. $25.00.
THIS BOOK IS MISTITLED. Less than a third of the text is devoted to "Operation
Wetback" as an event; most of the book deals with background to the operation,
including causes for Mexican immigration to the United States, the Bracero Program, U. S. and Mexican migration policies, the Border Patrol, debates in the
U. S. Congress, and conditions among undocumented persons. The reader has to
wait until Chapter 6 for "Operation Wetback," the notorious military-type campaign conducted in the summer of 1954 by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to rid this country of "illegal aliens."
At the conclusion of that operation, INS Commissioner Joseph Swing announced
that the "wetback" problem had ended and that the border "had been secured"
(p. 225). A retired general, Swing was not shy about exaggerating his accomplish-
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ments in office. Garda scrutinizes closely the INS claims and not only discovers
serious inconsistencies with reported statistical data, but finds "extremely undesirable and harmful outcomes" resulting from the operation (p. 227). According
to the INS, the campaign led to the "departure" of 1.3 million "wetbacks," but
only a small fraction consisted of actual apprehensions. La migra took plenty of
liberty in "guessing" that hundreds of thousands were driven by fear to leave the
country on their own. Garda points out that after the event the "illegal alien"
problem quickly returned, that Mexican Americans suffered serious harassment
during the raids, and that employers hired more braceros to replace the undocumented, an action that proved detrimental to U.S. workers.
In providing background toward a fuller understanding of "Operation Wetback,"
Garda has given the best and perhaps most objective synthesis available on
immigration problems during the period. His thorough examination of U. S. public
documents yields fresh information and insights on the chronic immigration debate, on lobbying efforts by different interest groups, on the issue's ironies and
contradictions, on U.S. manipulation of the Mexican workers, and on Mexico
City's response to U. S. actions. Especially interesting are the author's descriptions
of efforts by Mexican American groups such as LULAC to influence policy, of
internal debate in Mexico on the immigration issue, and of the resistance in the
Texas Lower Rio Grande Valley to "Operation Wetback"
A shortcoming of the book is that only a small portion of the view from south
of the border is given. Mexican archives should be examined in the near future
to provide a more complete picture. While the author used some oral history
materials covering the experiences and views of immigration officials, one wonders
ifhe attempted to interview any victims of "Operation Wetback" The work would
have been enriched with that kind of perspective. Inclusion of better maps and
larger print also would have added to the presentation. Still, this book fills a real
void and is recommended reading for those concerned with the topic of immigration.

University of Texas, El Paso
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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR:
The July 1981 issue of the New Mexico Historical Review contains an interesting
article by Professor David Weber entitled "American Westward Expansion and
the Breakdown of Relations Between Pobladores and 'Indios Barbaros' on Mexico's Far Northern Frontier, 1821-1846." Weber develops, through careful examination of Mexico's receding northern fronti€r during the early 1800s, an
explanation of the role of United States trade with Indians. In selling guns to the
Indians, Weber argues, the traders helped improve Indian military capability and
provided easy markets for goods taken in Mexico-thus increasing Indian raiding.
As a result, the efficient trade system of Mexico, used previously to control the
Indians, now collapsed.
To be accepted this argument needs to answer several questions. Were guns
better weapons than bows and arrows? If so, was their distribution in the early
1800s wide enough to make a significant difference?
Statements that Indians preferred guns are not proof of their superiority. Consider, for example, the observation of the gun historian and collector Charles
Winthrop Sawyer regarding the eastern U.S. Indians in the 1630s:
As the Indian's natural weapon was better than the matchlock gun, it is to
be supposed that the Indian would hold the gun in contempt, but the
contrary is true. Its pyrotechnic qualities savored to him of magic, and made
him covetous of it. 1
Statements by Mexican officials are also suspect. As loyal officials, they were
expected to argue that U. S. traders were the source ofIndian problems. Americans
could serve as convenient scapegoats for Mexican bureaucratic impotence, and
the statements of some Mexican officials betray that fact.
In addition, the remarks by the Little Rock Arkansas Gazette ofJuly 1826 must
be viewed in context. These comments that the Comanches could fight the Mexicans only so long as they received supplies from U.S. traders may reflect the
contemporary view of Indians as so inferior that their military successes resulted
only from "White influences." An unemotional evaluation of the bow and arrow,
the most important symbol of "savagery," was difficult, particularly since most
Americans in the early 1800s had little understanding of how effective these
.weapons could be.
Still, bows possessed several advantages over the gun. Arrows (like a mortar)
could be fired indirectly, they had a larger germ-bearing surface, they could shatter
in the wound, and often they were designed to detach from the shaft when entering
a body. With arrows such as these, Indians did not have to rely upon others for
supplies and maintenance .
.
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Accounts of u. S. Indian wars during the latter half of the nineteenth century
claim that Indians were not accurate with firearms because they lacked ammunition to use for practice? This would have been even more of a problem in the
Mexican period.
Perhaps the best way to resolve the question of when guns became superior
would be through studies of the effectiveness of these two weapons. Clearly, at
some point firearms superseded the bow, but the question is when this happened.
One military historian argues that this change did not occur until just before the
Civil War when the breech-loading rifle was developed. 3
Even if one assumes that guns were superior to bows in the early 1800s one
still needs to demonstrate that guns were sufficiently available to be an important
force. Among the Navajo, guns were not common until the 1850s. 4 Similarly, the
Mohaves apparently lacked firearms during a battle in the 1850s with neighboring
tribes. 5
Finally, consider the crucial point of how much Indian raiding expanded as a
result of trade with Anglos. From 1810-70, substantial trade in stolen Mexican
goods existed between several Indian tribes, and oddly enough, with Mexico.
Whether u.S. traders added much volume to this ongoing market is a question
for which little reliable information exists.
Josiah Gregg, an attentive observer of the Southwest and an experienced southwestern trader, deals with this question in his Commerce of the Prairies when he
notes: "Although an occasional foreigner engaged in this clandestine and culpable
traffic, yet the natives themselves embarked in it beyond comparison more extensively. . . ." Gregg then adds in disgust: "This traffic was not only tolerated
but openly encouraged by the civil authorities, as the highest public functionaries
were interested in its success-the governor himself not excepted."6 Indeed,
sometimes Mexican state governments went so far as to establish what amounted
to "free trade areas" where Apache raiders could trade goods taken in other areas
of Mexico. 7
Professor Weber's focus on u.S. Indian trade is an important new explanation
of problems on Mexico's far northern frontier in the early 1800s, but the questions
raised here need further explanation before all of his interpretations can be accepted.

San Diego, Calif.

DONALD
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NOTES

1. Charles Winthrop Sawyer, Firearms in American History: 1600 to 1800, 3
vols. (Boston: Privately Printed, 1910), 1:9.
2. Roland Dean Vangen, Indian Weapons (Palmer Lake, Colo.: Filter Press,
1972), p. 31.
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Charter, 1975), p. 14.
4. Clyde Kluckhohn, W. W. Hill, Lucy Wales Kluckhohn, Navajo Material
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5. Alfred L. Kroeber, Handbook of the Indians of California; Smithsonian
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7. Joseph F. Park, "The Apaches in Mexican-American Relations, 1848-1861:
A Footnote to the Gadsden Treaty," Arizona and the West 3 (Summer 1961): 12946.

Professor Weber replies:
I am pleased that my article provoked the important questions raised so clearly
by Donald Matson. He is right in suggesting that we need to know much more
before we can regard interpretations of this period as definitive, and that one of
the murky areas is the relative merits of guns and bows. I explicitly stated that
contemporaries did not agree on this question, although a majority seem to believe
that firearms held the advantage. When Juan N. Almonte recommended the
Choctaws as a valuable addition to the Texas militia in 1834, for example, he did
not mention their skill with bows, but pronounced them "excellent shots with a
rifle."l
Much depended, of course, on the quality of the individual weapon and the
skill and tactics of the person using it. In general, though, guns apparently had
a greater range than bows, but bows probably had greater penetrating power and
accuracy over short distances, and could be fired more rapidly.- From the e~stern
woodlands to the Rockies, however, Indians who possessed firearms usually defeated Indians who did not, and neither Indians nor Europeans reverted to bows
and arrows when given a choice. As the technology of gun manufacture improved,
the gulf between bows and guns widened. By the middle of the Mexican period
Americans had introduced into the West a substantial number of rifles. Those had
far greater accuracy and range than the muskets commonly used in the eighteenth
century.3
My argument does not rest, however, on the supposition that guns of the early
nineteenth century were superior to bows and arrows. What contemporaries
believed is also important, for weapons may hold psychological as well as military
advantages. In this case, both Mexicans and Indians clearly wanted firearms.
Perhaps the explosion of black powder had magical qualities for Indians, as Matson
suggests, and guns may also have been status symbols. Nevertheless, Indians
chose to use firearms as weapons in warfare even if, as one Spanish official put
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it, the Indians "believe mistakenly that they [guns] are the most advantageous. "4
Equally important, Mexican frontiersmen frequently expressed alarm that "barbaric" Indians were obtaining firearms, and Mexicans also lamented their own
shortages of guns and munitions. It seems unlikely that they would have voiced
such concerns if they believed firearms were inferior.
Much of what we know about this comes from potentially biased sources, as
Matson points out. Mexican observers might have exaggerated the importance of
firearms, and used American suppliers "as convenient scapegoats for Mexican
bureaucratic impotence" as Matson says. Mexican reports were so widespread,
however, and derived from persons who had no vested interest in the matter
(such as the Swiss scientist Berlandier), or who would have been pleased to expose
"bureaucratic impotence" (such as the priests Manuel Rada and Antonio Jose
Martinez), that I am inclined to take them at their word. 5 Moreover, the passage
of Mexican laws and official orders aimed at curtailing American gun running
transcends rhetoric and suggests the existence of a real problem.
I agree with Matson, and made the point in my article, that some enterprising
Mexicans also traded guns to Indians. The assertion of nationalistic Josiah Gregg
that Mexicans outnumbered Americans in this unscrupulous business cannot,
however, be taken seriously. Even in those areas where he furnished statistics,
Gregg's estimates are not accurate. In any event, the guns and ammunition that
Mexican traders furnished to Indians very likely emanated from the United States,
for those implements were in short supply on the Mexican frontier. 6
Matson also raises the question of the extent of distribution of guns among
Indians (a question that would presumably be irrelevant if guns were not as
effective as bows). A precise answer is not possible, but it is clear that by the
mid-1830s thousands of rifles, some made specifically for the Indian trade, came
into Indian hands every year. 7 Presuming that these rifles had some advantage
in raiding, even a few hundred armed and hostile Indians, using guerrilla tactics,
could make an impa~t upon the sparsely settled Mexican frontier. The Mexican
population of Texas, for example, totaled some 2,500 in 1821. About 40 percent
of the tejanos were under sixteen, leaving an adult population of perhaps 1,500,
about half of whom were women. Discounting the elderly' and the infirm, the
effective fighting force in Texas probably did not exceed 600 adult males, dispersed
in several communities. 8
Finally, in arguing thatAmerican expansion contributed to upsetting relations
between independent Indian peoples and Mexican frontiersmen, I did not claim
that firearms in themselves accounted for Indian successes: "perhaps more important than the weapons Americans furnished . . . was the market they [the
Americans] provided for stolen property, thereby encouraging Indian raids on
northern Mexico" (p. 224). I also pointed to Mexico's waning military posture on
the frontier (a matter that I elaborate on in a forthcoming book), and to "demographic pressures from westward-moving American settlers" (p. 229). The point,
quite simply, is that "American westward expansion made Mexico's task more
difficult" (p. 233).
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I am grateful to Don Matson for forcing me to rethink these questions more
carefully and to restate my position more precisely. I hope that anthropologists,
ethnohistorians, and weapons specialists with interests in these matters might
enlighten us further.

Southern Methodist University
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